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I. Introduction 
Consider the following hypothetical: William Defendant is 
charged with first degree murder. William and his mother scrape 
together $15,000, deplete their life savings, and hire an attorney 
to represent William in the early stages of his criminal trial before 
his bail hearing.1 Prior to the beginning of jury selection, however, 
William becomes dissatisfied with his attorney’s minimal 
communication and trial strategy and wishes to fire him. William’s 
hired attorney files a motion to withdraw from the case. The court 
is aware that if it permits William’s attorney to withdraw from the 
case it will be required to either appoint William a new lawyer or 
find that he is able to proceed pro se before proceeding with jury 
selection due to William’s inability to pay for future 
representation. The court is presented with a dilemma: does 
William have to satisfy a good cause showing to dismiss his 
retained counsel and have the court appoint counsel? If the answer 
to the first question is yes, what does that good cause showing 
require William to prove? 
As American jurisprudence currently stands, this question is 
in a state of flux. The Ninth2 and Eleventh Circuits3 do not require 
any showing for a criminal defendant to dismiss retained counsel 
and seek court-appointed counsel, while the First Circuit4 requires 
a showing of good cause for a criminal defendant to dismiss 
retained counsel and seek court-appointed counsel.5 The question 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Dixon v. Owens, 865 P.2d 1250, 1251 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (basing 
the hypothetical on the facts of the denial of Mr. Dixon’s motion to substitute 
appointed counsel for retained counsel).  
 2. United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 3. United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 4. United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 5. Compare Brown, 785 F.3d at 1344 (finding that a criminal defendant is 
entitled to the Sixth Amendment right to discharge his retained counsel and to 
proceed with different, court-appointed attorney instead), and Jimenez-Antunez, 
820 F.3d at 1271 (“A defendant exercises the right to counsel of choice when he 
moves to dismiss retained counsel, regardless of the type of counsel he wishes to 
engage afterward.”) (emphasis added), with Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 46–47 
(“[T]here are two actions of the court at issue: its refusal to allow Sanchez to 
withdraw and its refusal to appoint substitute counsel . . . . [A] defendant is not 
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presented by these conflicting requirements—one that this Note 
seeks to resolve—is whether a criminal defendant who qualifies for 
appointed counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A and wishes to dismiss 
currently retained counsel and seek appointed counsel must show 
“good cause” to dismiss their retained counsel. Good cause in this 
context refers to “a fundamental problem, ‘such as a conflict of 
interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an 
irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust 
verdict.’”6  
Suppose William is required to make a good cause showing to 
dismiss his currently retained counsel—why should this matter? 
Legally, such a showing prohibits William from asserting two of 
the rights protected under the Sixth Amendment—the right to 
counsel of choice and the right to court-appointed counsel—unless 
he can satisfy the required showing.7 Practically, unless William 
can make this good cause showing, he will be forced to proceed with 
the counsel who he wishes to fire or to represent himself in his 
criminal trial. An appellate court should treat this denial as a 
structural error warranting reversal of the criminal proceeding.8 
This denial of William’s fundamental right to the assistance of 
counsel will now require a new criminal trial in which William will 
be granted his right to counsel of choice. The prospect of a new trial 
may raise concerns of economic cost and general efficiency, the 
likely motivators for requiring a showing of good cause in the first 
instance.9 The question of whether William should be required to 
                                                                                                     
ordinarily dependent on the court’s permission to replace retained counsel. But 
here the two actions merge . . . .”). 
 6. United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
 7. See Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 46–47 (describing the court’s requirement 
that the defendant satisfy a showing of good cause to replace counsel with 
court-appointed counsel). 
 8. See United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2142 (2013) (“[S]tructural 
errors [such as] denial of counsel of choice . . . trigger automatic reversal because 
they undermine the fairness of the entire criminal proceeding.”). 
 9. See State v. Cromwell, 119 P.3d 448, 454 (Ariz. 2005) (“[W]hen 
considering a motion to substitute counsel, the judge evaluates several factors 
designed specifically to balance the rights and interests of the defendant against 
the public interest in judicial economy, efficiency and fairness.” (citing State v. 
Moody, 968 P.2d 578, 580 (Ariz. 1998))). 
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satisfy an initial good cause showing has produced different 
answers from courts across the country. 
If William Defendant finds himself in the First Circuit as he 
moves to fire his retained counsel and seek court-appointed 
counsel, he had better be sure he has the evidence to satisfy a good 
cause showing.10 Alternatively, if William Defendant finds himself 
in the Ninth or Eleventh Circuits, then he does not need to make 
any showing and the court must grant his motion unless a denial 
is “compelled by ‘purposes inherent in the fair, efficient and orderly 
administration of justice.’”11 This Note seeks to resolve these 
disparate results.12 Conditioning William’s right to fire retained 
counsel on his ability to show good cause imposes a burden on this 
fundamental right recognized by the Supreme Court.13 This 
quasi-denial violates William’s fundamental right to counsel 
expressly guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 
Part II of this Note addresses the history and evolution of the 
right to counsel.14 Part III examines the different approaches 
employed by the federal circuit courts for handling a criminal 
defendant’s request to substitute appointed counsel for retained 
counsel and to thus assert both the right to counsel of choice and 
                                                                                                     
 10. See Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 47 (requiring a showing of good cause 
prior to the court’s grant of a defendant’s motion to dismiss retained counsel and 
seek court appointment of new counsel). 
 11. United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1347 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 
United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 12. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the necessity of treating a 
criminal defendant’s motion to discharge retained counsel and seek 
court-appointed counsel as two separate actions). To allow these actions to merge, 
as the First Circuit does in United States v. Mota-Santana, creates confusion and 
may lead to the conclusion that such a criminal defendant must show good cause 
before being permitted to substitute court-appointed counsel for retained counsel. 
Id. 
 13. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006) (“The 
right to select counsel of one’s choice . . . has been regarded as the root meaning 
of the constitutional guarantee [of the Sixth Amendment].”); see also Kaley v. 
United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1107 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“An 
individual’s right to counsel of choice is violated ‘whenever the defendant’s choice 
is wrongfully denied,’ and such error ‘pervades the entire trial.’” (quoting 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150)). 
 14. See discussion infra Part II (laying the groundwork for the American 
tradition, discussing the inception of the American right to the assistance of 
counsel, and addressing the eventual adoption, and later evolution of the Sixth 
Amendment). 
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right to court-appointed counsel.15 In Part IV, this Note advocates 
that an indigent criminal defendant’s motion to discharge retained 
counsel and thereafter seek court-appointed counsel ought to be 
treated as two distinct and independent actions.16 Part V discusses 
the practical implications of the proposed judicial framework and 
concludes that such a treatment is necessary to enable indigent 
criminal defendants the full enjoyment of their Sixth Amendment 
rights.17 
II. The Historical Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”18 The Counsel Clause,19 as 
it is aptly named, has evolved considerably since its ratification in 
the Bill of Rights and now encompasses five distinct rights: (1) the 
right to counsel of choice;20 (2) the right to court-appointed 
counsel;21 (3) the right to conflict-free counsel;22 (4) the right to the 
                                                                                                     
 15. See discussion infra Part III (detailing the cases that present the circuit 
split, explaining their holdings, and discussing their impact on criminal 
defendants). 
 16. See discussion infra Part IV (arguing that independent treatment of the 
actions included in a defendant’s motion allows for a fuller realization and 
enjoyment of their Sixth Amendment rights, a necessary treatment due to the 
absence of a remedy for violations of the right to counsel of choice). 
 17. See discussion infra Part V (acknowledging the limitations of the 
proposed treatment and concluding that such a treatment is necessary to fulfill 
the court’s obligation under the Sixth Amendment). 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 19. See Laurie S. Fulton, The Right to Counsel Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1599, 1605 (1989) (“The responsibility for 
determining the scope of the right to counsel clause has fallen to the courts in the 
United States as it had in historical England.”). 
 20. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147–48 (“The right to select counsel of 
one’s choice . . . has been regarded as the root meaning of the constitutional 
guarantee [of the Sixth Amendment].”). 
 21. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[I]n our adversary 
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a 
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”). 
 22. See Bonin v. California, 494 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1990) (“[A] defendant who 
shows an actual conflict need not demonstrate that his counsel’s divided loyalties 
prejudiced the outcome of his trial.” (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349–
50 (1980))); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) (“The mere 
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effective assistance of counsel;23 and (5) the right to represent 
oneself pro se.24 Accordingly, rights now firmly understood to be a 
part of the guarantee to assistance of counsel, although previously 
not recognized, have developed and become of central importance 
to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.25 In a concurring opinion in 
Argersinger v. Hamlin,26 Chief Justice Burger concluded that 
“[t]he right to counsel has historically been an evolving concept.”27 
Understanding this full evolution of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee, from its inception to its current state, is critical to 
determining how courts ought to respond when a defendant asserts 
a right that conflicts with another protected by the amendment or 
other legal requirement.28 
                                                                                                     
physical presence of an attorney does not fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee 
when the advocate’s conflicting obligations have effectively sealed his lips on 
crucial matters.”). 
 23. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (“[T]he purpose 
of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is . . . to ensure that 
criminal defendants receive a fair trial.”). 
 24. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) 
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be 
made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to 
make his defense. Although not stated in the Amendment in so many 
words, the right to self-representation—to make one’s own defense 
personally—is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the 
Amendment. 
 25. See John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to 
Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013) (“[S]ubsequent interpreters of the 
Sixth Amendment have found a right to counsel much broader than that foreseen 
by the Framers, and one more consonant with the values of a changing cultural 
context.”). 
 26. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
 27. Id. at 44 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 28. See Margaret J. Ryan, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: A 
Criminal Defendant’s Right to Counsel of Choice v. the Courts’ Interest in 
Conflict-Free Representation, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 657, 658 (1989) (disputing the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) to allow 
substantial latitude to lower courts in refusing waiver of conflict of interest by a 
criminal defendant seeking their right to counsel in cases where a conflict may 
exist). 
IN THEIR DEFENSE 1749 
A. English Common Law 
Considering the broad Sixth Amendment rights to counsel 
that defendants enjoy today, it may be surprising that the right to 
counsel had a very narrow beginning.29 The evolution and 
expansion of the Counsel Clause reflects the development of the 
American criminal justice system and the importance of 
protections for criminal defendants within this system.30 
Specifically, the growth of the Sixth Amendment has furthered the 
notion that criminal defendants are entitled to heightened 
protections and privileges within a criminal trial because of what 
is at stake.31 Consequently, it is important to note the critical 
differences between what a criminal trial involved during early 
                                                                                                     
 29. See JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 1 
(2002) (“Originally, only those accused of minor offenses could be represented by 
counsel; those charged with serious offenses were denied the opportunity for legal 
representation.”).  
 30. See Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in 
Habeas Corpus, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 541, 545 (2008) (“Since the United States 
Supreme Court first began to evaluate the parameters of the constitutional right 
to counsel in criminal cases, it has underscored the essential role of the ‘guiding 
hand of counsel’ in enforcing the principles of justice enunciated and elevated in 
the Constitution.”). 
 31. See Wilcher v. State, 697 So. 2d 1087, 1117 (Miss. 1997) (Sullivan, J., 
dissenting) (“[C]riminal law requires more than an equal playing field. Criminal 
defendants are entitled to heightened protection in criminal law, such as the 
Eighth Amendment right to allow all mitigating evidence at the sentencing stage, 
or as reflected in the rules of evidence . . . .”); see also Michael M. Raeber, Toward 
an Integrated Rule Prohibiting all Race-Based Peremptory Challenges: Some 
Considerations on Georgia v. McCollum, 26 GA. L. REV. 503, 529 (1992) 
Professor Goldwasser . . . contends that criminal defendants deserve 
preferential treatment in the use of peremptory challenges for two 
reasons: first, disparate treatment is justified because such asymmetry 
is inherent in the constitutional protections afforded criminal 
defendants; second, criminal defendants are entitled to differential 
treatment because what is at stake for a criminal defendant is 
“intensely personal.” 
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English common law32 and what exists in the American system 
today.33 
Under English common law, criminal charges were typically 
brought by the afflicted party, or their hired representation, and 
trials were quick and informal.34 The jurors, the defendant, and 
the prosecutor actively engaged with the evidence, asking 
questions by simply blurting them out in open court.35 The judge 
served more as a referee, adding an element of supervision to an 
otherwise disorderedly proceeding.36 A criminal defendant 
experienced a number of severe obstacles to presenting an effective 
defense,37 but none more sweeping than the prohibition of the 
accused from employing counsel.38 
                                                                                                     
 32. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 1 
[E]arly English law reveals that the right to counsel had surprisingly 
modest beginnings . . . . The monarch’s refusal to permit counsel for 
those who stood to lose the most was rooted in a fear that lawyers 
would prevent the successful prosecution and punishment of those 
whose acts most threatened the state’s survival. 
 33. See id. at 2 (discussing the American evolution of the right to the 
assistance of counsel after the initial rejection of England’s restrictive approach). 
 34. See id. at 1–2 (explaining the nature of criminal defense trials in 
late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth-century England). 
 35. See id. at 3 (“The private prosecutor—the victim or a representative—
would present his testimony and the testimony of other witnesses, and the 
accused, unaided by counsel, would respond to the evidence. The defendant, like 
the jurors, could ask questions of witnesses at any time simply by blurting them 
out.”). 
 36. See id. (stating that the chaotic trial environment was supervised by a 
judge who sat to make sure illegal procedures were not used by the parties). 
 37. Felony criminal defendants were typically confined until the time of trial. 
Id. (citing J.M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English 
Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW. & HIS. REV. 
221, 223 (1991)). Further, a criminal defendant did not receive a copy of his 
indictment, was not informed of the prosecution’s evidence against him, and had 
no set procedures for compelling a witness to testify. Id. (citing Francis H. Heller, 
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 10 (Univ. of Kan. Press 1951); J.M. Beattie, 
CRIMES AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660–1800 271 (Princeton Univ. Press 
1986); J.M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal 
Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW. & HIS. REV. 221, 223 
(1991)). 
 38. See id. (“[A] common law rule . . . prohibited those accused of . . . serious 
offenses from employing lawyers to assist in their defense.” (citing JAMES 
FITZGERALD STEPHENS, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 397 (1883))). 
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Under early English common law, the criminal defendant’s 
right to counsel varied based upon the alleged offense.39 In general, 
“[f]or less serious crimes classified as trespasses or 
misdemeanors—offenses that could be punished only by 
incarceration or pecuniary loss—a defendant could employ a 
lawyer to present his defense.”40 In contrast, until the middle of 
the eighteenth century, a criminal defendant charged with a more 
serious crime, “such as murder, manslaughter, larceny, robbery, or 
rape, or treason or misprision of treason,” was prohibited from 
employing counsel to aid in their defense.41 British courts were 
well aware of the potential cost of providing counsel for sweeping 
groups of criminal defendants and consequently were interested in 
avoiding it.42  
There were several rationales behind the prohibition of 
lawyers for criminal defendants accused of serious crimes. For the 
courts to provide counsel, society must bear the financial cost of 
paying for these lawyers.43 Additionally, courts perceived criminal 
defense lawyers as strains on society, further frustrating the jobs 
of police and prosecutors.44 Therefore, a policy against providing 
counsel to defendants accused of a serious crime was justified by 
self-preservation: “The assistance of counsel was seen as an 
impediment to efficient and successful prosecution and 
punishment.”45 Further, the state suggested “that the assistance 
                                                                                                     
 39. See id. (explaining that at English common law criminal defendants 
charged with less serious offenses were better able to retain counsel while those 
charged with felonies could not). 
 40. Id. (citing WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN 
COURTS 8 (Univ. Mich. Publ’ns 1955)). 
 41. See id. (stating the English common law policy concerning 
representation for criminal defendants accused of serious crimes). 
 42. See King, supra note 25, at 7 (stating the cost to British society of 
providing counsel for broad groups of defendants). 
 43. See id. (stating the inevitable financial cost imposed on society as a result 
of paying lawyers for defendants entitled to counsel). 
 44. See id. (“[T]he additional lawyers can be seen as imposing a cost on 
society by making the job of the police and prosecution more difficult.”). 
 45. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 4. Several rationalizations supported a 
total prohibition of the assistance of counsel for defendants charged with serious 
crimes, such as the belief that individuals brought to trial were assumed guilty 
and considered threats to the state. See id. (stating the assumption that 
defendants were presumed guilty and considered a danger to the state thus 
necessitating a quick and successful prosecution). Further, allowing the accused 
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of counsel was ‘hardly necessary’ because criminal proceedings 
were sufficiently simple for an accused—at least an innocent 
accused—to cope with by himself.”46 At this point in English 
common law, even if a criminal defendant was permitted to retain 
counsel, there was no right to the assistance of counsel.47 
The prohibition on engaging defense counsel in serious cases 
slowly diminished with the emergence of professional prosecutors 
and a strengthened police force.48 This development occurred at a 
point when the English government was more stable and no longer 
necessitated an emphasis on self-preservation.49 Beginning at the 
end of the seventeenth Century and continuing throughout the 
eighteenth Century, criminal defendants accused of a broad 
spectrum of crimes retained counsel more frequently.50 In fact, 
“[b]y the end of the eighteenth century, judges were frequently 
permitting those accused of felonies to be assisted by counsel, and 
defense lawyers were being allowed to perform most defense 
functions . . . .”51 Yet, this transformation was not as broad as it 
may seem—judges exercised considerable discretion as to whether 
to allow defense counsel and, if so, the degree to which the attorney 
could participate in the proceedings.52 There were no “codified or 
                                                                                                     
to retain counsel would threaten self-preservation efforts necessary to protect the 
state. For example, the weak police force meant less evidence could be collected 
against the accused and consequently a greater possibility of counsel preventing 
convictions. See id. (“By obstructing the criminal process and sometimes 
preventing convictions, counsel could interfere with the state’s self-protective 
efforts.”). 
 46. Id. (citing THEODORE F. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON 
LAW 410 (1948)). 
 47. See King, supra note 25, at 7 (“Those charged with less serious crimes 
(generally, those not punishable by death) were entitled to retain counsel, but no 
right to the assistance of counsel existed beyond the right to retain one’s own 
counsel at personal expense.” (emphasis added)). 
 48. See id. (explaining the cause of the decline of the prohibition on defense 
counsel participation in serious criminal trials). 
 49. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 7 (“An additional reason that the courts 
were willing to depart from the restrictive common law rule was that the 
government had grown much more stable in the late seventeenth century. The 
increased security of the state diminished the concern with self-preservation.”). 
 50. See id. at 6 (describing the development of a criminal defendant’s right 
to counsel in the English common law). 
 51. Id.  
 52. See id. at 7 (stating that although criminal defendants were more 
frequently permitted to retain counsel, this right and its scope depended entirely 
IN THEIR DEFENSE 1753 
uniform rules that dictated the scope of counsel’s involvement in 
each case.”53 The lack of codified rules concerning the assistance of 
counsel resulted in an uneven distribution of the right and led to 
concerns about the integrity of, what was perceived as, an 
arbitrary system.54 
Despite William Blackstone’s urging that the need for 
counsel’s assistance was “worthy [of] the imposition of the 
legislature,” British criminal proceedings persisted without 
legislative guarantees of the right to counsel.55 In fact, while the 
Sixth Amendment was in the process of drafting and ratification 
in the United States, “England still only guaranteed the right to 
retain counsel to defendants charged with misdemeanors, and 
even then only at their own expense.”56 Even prior to the adoption 
of the Sixth Amendment, however, American colonies began to 
recognize the importance of this issue and developed a much 
broader (though uncodified) concept of the right to counsel than 
the English courts.57 
B. The Beginnings of the American Tradition 
Similar to the development of criminal defendants’ right to 
counsel in English common law, the American colonies experienced 
an evolution of the right to the assistance of counsel prior to the 
adoption of the Sixth Amendment.58 In the early colonial period, 
the criminal justice system resembled England’s under the 
common law regime; criminal trials were informal and private 
                                                                                                     
on the judge’s discretion). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See WILLIAM H. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 10 
(Univ. Mich. Publ’ns 1955) (noting that the absence of a statutory basis for 
counsel’s assistance resulted in a wide variety of applications). 
 55. Id. at 8. 
 56. King, supra note 25, at 7 (citing JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 8 (2002)). 
 57. See id. at 8. (stating the early development of the criminal defendant’s 
right to counsel in the American colonies). 
 58. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 9 (“[M]ost of the colonies departed 
dramatically from the restrictive approach to counsel of the British common 
law.”). 
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parties prosecuted the crimes.59 Criminal defendants, on the other 
hand, typically represented themselves due to a lack of 
well-trained attorneys and a general distrust for the legal 
profession.60 However, at the time the Sixth Amendment was 
ratified and recognized a federal right to the assistance of counsel, 
“at least eleven of the thirteen states had enacted, either by 
constitution or statute, a general right to be represented by 
counsel . . . .”61 This amendment responded to the threat to an 
accused’s rights and interests stemming from a criminal 
prosecution in an adversarial system by recognizing the necessity 
of defense counsel.62 
The development of this right in the United States paralleled 
its development in the British courts. By the time of the American 
Revolution, professional prosecutors in every colony were handling 
criminal cases.63 The number of trained lawyers similarly 
increased steadily, which made it easier for a criminal defendant 
to retain legal assistance.64 Further, the public attitude concerning 
lawyers changed “as the colonists came to recognize the critical 
roles that counsel could play in protecting individual rights and 
liberties against oppressive or overreaching government 
authorities.”65 Each of these changes in the American colonies 
helped further develop and expand the right to counsel.66 
Even so, when the Constitution was signed in September of 
1787, there was no mention of the criminal defendant’s right to 
                                                                                                     
 59. See id. (analogizing the early American colonial criminal justice 
processes to the system that operated in the English common law). 
 60. See id. (stating why criminal defendants in American colonies chose to 
proceed without retaining counsel). 
 61. Id.  
 62. See id. at 10 (explaining that the denial of representation to a criminal 
defendant was unfair due to the implications and stigmas associated with a 
criminal prosecution and the critical role that defense counsel can play). 
 63. See id. at 9 (stating that by the American revolution every colony 
employed professionally trained and funded lawyers to prosecute criminal 
charges). 
 64. See id. (explaining the development of the colonial right to counsel by 
showing the increased availability of trained legal representation). 
 65. Id. at 10. 
 66. See id. (stating that the culmination of the changes that occurred in the 
colonial period allowed for the development of the right to counsel). 
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assistance of counsel—or any liberty interests for that matter.67 
The delegates quickly rejected the proposed articulation of 
liberties to be protected from government intrusion, including, for 
example, the right to assistance of counsel.68 It later became clear 
during the “ratification debates that the Constitution would not be 
ratified in the state conventions without a bill of rights.”69 James 
Madison proposed an initial draft of the amendments in June of 
1789, which included the text of what would become the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.70 The proposed amendment 
“includ[ed] in its declaration that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy . . . the right to assistance of counsel for his 
defence.’”71 The delegates agreed to this construction and in 1791 
it became the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.72 
C. The Right to Court-Appointed Counsel 
Following the ratification of the Sixth Amendment in 1791, 
the right to counsel expanded to eventually encompass a critical 
                                                                                                     
 67. We can attribute the inattention to criminal defendants’ rights in the 
Constitution to two distinct reasons. First, the states maintained a wide variety 
of processes and it seemed unlikely that the convention would be able to reach an 
acceptable consensus on a uniform set of federal rights. See id. at 15 (“[T]he wide 
variation in procedures among the states made it seem unlikely that consensus 
could be reached regarding the rights that should be included in the national 
charter.”). Second, the Framers believed that the state criminal justice systems 
would be responsible for the majority of the criminal prosecutions. See id. (stating 
that state criminal justice systems were the presumed outlet for criminal 
prosecutions, thus making the discussion of the rights of federal defendants seem 
unnecessary). With this assumption, it did not make sense to spend time 
developing the rights for federal criminal defendants. See id. (explaining why the 
Framers seemingly ignored the rights of criminal defendants in drafting the 
Constitution). 
 68. See id. (stating that George Mason’s motion to include a Bill of Rights to 
the Constitution was immediately rejected without debate or comment). 
 69. Id. at 17. 
 70. See id. at 19 (detailing Madison’s efforts and proposed draft of 
amendments to Congress, including the fourth proposition which would later 
become part of the Sixth Amendment).  
 71. Id. at 20 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). 
 72. See id. (“In 1791, that provision became the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.”). 
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right for criminal defendants—the right of indigent criminal 
defendants to court-appointed counsel.73 
1. Powell v. Alabama 
In 1932, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Powell v. 
Alabama74 and first established the constitutional right to 
court-appointed counsel.75 The Court was faced with the case of the 
“Scottsboro Boys,” as it has become known in the years since the 
decision.76 In March of 1931, nine black youths found themselves 
sitting in the Scottsboro jail charged with the rape of two white 
girls they claimed to have never seen before.77 The trials began just 
twelve days after their arrest and the Scottsboro Boys did not have 
much in terms of counsel.78 Unsurprisingly, “[f]our juries, trying 
the defendants two or three at a time, quickly concluded that the 
Scottsboro Boys were guilty.”79 On appeal, the defendants 
contended they had been denied their right to counsel and were 
entitled to a new trial.80 In response to the seminal question of 
                                                                                                     
 73. See King, supra note 25, at 8 (expressing the development of the right to 
counsel in the United States after the adoption of the Sixth Amendment). 
 74. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 75. See id. at 71 (finding the constitutional right to appointed counsel in 
specific circumstances of capital cases). 
 76. See Douglas O. Linder, Without Fear or Favor: Judge James Edwin 
Horton and the Trial of the Scottsboro Boys, 68 UMKC L. REV. 549, 549 (1999) 
(describing the lasting impact of Powell). 
 77. See id. (describing the charges brought against the group of men who 
later became known as the Scottsboro Boys). 
 78. See id. at 552 (describing the counsel for the criminal defendants as the 
initial appointment of the entire local bar and later an out of town lawyer 
accompanied by an old and unreliable local lawyer). Stephen Roddy and Milo 
Moody served as counsel for the Scottsboro defendants. Id. “Roddy was an 
out-of-state real estate attorney who, on the first day of trial, ‘was so stewed he 
could scarcely walk straight,’ while sixty-nine-year-old Moody was a ‘doddering, 
extremely unreliable, senile individual’ who was ‘losing whatever ability he once 
had.’” Id. In addition to the general inability to meet the task at bar, the attorneys 
had less than a half-hour to interview their clients prior to trial. See id. 
(discussing the attorneys’ ability to prepare the case before the trials began). 
Further, the defense lawyers “offered no cross-examination of the state’s medical 
evidence, made nothing of differences between the accounts of [the alleged 
victims], and presented no closing argument.” Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50 (1932) (considering the issues on 
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whether the Scottsboro Boys were constitutionally entitled to 
court-appointed counsel, the Court articulated a narrow class of 
defendants entitled to appointed counsel, but extended the right 
no further.81 The Court stated: 
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ 
counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense 
because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, 
it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign 
counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; 
and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time 
or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of 
effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.82 
The Court reasoned that “[t]o hold otherwise would be to ignore 
the fundamental postulate . . . ‘that there are certain immutable 
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free 
government . . . .’”83 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Powell also 
included a statement that acknowledged the importance of defense 
counsel and the connection to the reliability of the evidence: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if 
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the 
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no 
skill in the science of law . . . . He requires the guiding hand of 
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without 
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction 
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.84 
In Powell, however, the Court intentionally narrowed the scope of 
its holding and left open questions about how this right would 
apply in cases involving less serious charges and less compelling 
circumstances.85 The narrow holding and fact-specific nature of 
Powell were flexible, but did not provide a definite framework for 
                                                                                                     
appeal before the Supreme Court and discussing only the supposed denial of the 
right to counsel).  
 81. See id. at 71 (discussing the necessity of deciding the case before the 
Court today and the need to go no further). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 71–72 (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)). 
 84. Id. at 68–69. 
 85. See King, supra note 25, at 9 (explaining the narrow holding of the 
Supreme Court’s 1932 decision providing a criminal defendant with the right to 
court-appointed counsel). 
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future courts to follow.86 Further, the holding did not ensure future 
defendants the same constitutional protection because the decision 
defined a narrow subset of criminal defendants entitled to counsel, 
but extended the right no further.87 
2. Johnson v. Zerbst 
In 1938, six years later, the Supreme Court heard Johnson v. 
Zerbst88 and considered whether the relevant Sixth Amendment 
guarantee included a categorical right to court-appointed counsel 
for indigent federal defendants.89 In Zerbst, the petitioner was 
indicted for possession of counterfeit money. While the petitioner 
was represented at his preliminary hearing, he was unable to 
further afford counsel and thus proceeded to his criminal trial 
without counsel where he was convicted and sentenced.90 The 
evidence showed that petitioner made a request to the District 
Attorney to have counsel appointed, but was quickly denied and 
told he had no right to counsel.91 
The Zerbst Court proceeded to highlight the critical 
importance that the right to counsel plays for a federal defendant 
facing criminal prosecution.92 The Court decided against a 
case-by-case analysis in concluding that “[t]he Sixth Amendment 
withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the 
power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty 
                                                                                                     
 86. See id. (articulating the shortcomings of the Powell decision). 
 87. See id. (stating the subsequent implications of the Supreme Court’s 
narrow holding in Powell). 
 88. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).  
 89. See id. at 459 (considering whether in all federal criminal prosecutions 
an indigent defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel). 
 90. See id. at 460 (discussing the procedural history of the case before the 
Court). 
 91. See id. (“[P]etitioner’s evidence . . . [showed] that [a] request was made 
to the District Attorney . . . . [who] had indicated petitioner had no right to 
counsel.”). 
 92. See id. at 462–63 (“[The Sixth Amendment] embodies a realistic 
recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the 
professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with 
power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by 
experienced and learned counsel.”). 
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unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.”93 Notably 
however, the Court once again narrowed the holding by declining 
to extend this categorical grant to state court criminal 
proceedings.94 The decision not to extend this right to state 
criminal defendants ensured that such defendants continued to 
have no constitutional right to demand counsel if they were unable 
to personally afford a lawyer.95 
3. Betts v. Brady 
Just four years later, in Betts v. Brady,96 the Supreme Court 
declined to recognize a categorical right to court-appointed counsel 
for state-court indigent defendants.97 The Court addressed a state 
court’s denial of counsel to a defendant charged with robbery after 
the state court informed the defendant that counsel would only be 
appointed for rape and murder prosecutions.98 The Court stated 
that the right to assistance of counsel was “not a fundamental 
right, essential to a fair trial” and the states were not obligated 
under the Due Process Clause to provide a categorical right of 
counsel to criminal defendants.99 The Supreme Court’s express 
declaration that the right to court-appointed counsel was not 
fundamental lent credence to each state court’s denial of counsel 
to criminal defendants.100 States could have a policy of appointing 
                                                                                                     
 93. Id. at 463. 
 94. See King, supra note 25, at 9 (stating the Court’s decision to narrow the 
holding of Zerbst to apply only to federal indigent criminal defendants). 
 95. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (“The Sixth Amendment 
withholds from federal courts . . . the power and authority to deprive an accused 
of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 96. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
 97. See id. at 473 (stating the decision not to extend the holding of Zerbst to 
state court criminal proceedings).  
 98. See id. at 456–57 (describing the facts of the case). 
 99. See id. at 471 (“This material demonstrates that, in the great majority of 
the States, it has been the considered judgment of the people, their 
representatives and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a fundamental 
right, essential to a fair trial.”). 
 100. See id. at 471–72 (“[W]e are unable to say that . . . due 
process . . . obligates the states, whatever may be their own views, to furnish 
counsel in every . . . case. Every court has power, if it deems proper, to appoint 
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counsel in cases of rape or murder, but they were under no 
constitutional obligation to supply any criminal defendant with 
counsel.101 
It was not until 1963, over twenty years after the Betts 
decision, that the Supreme Court overruled Betts in Gideon v. 
Wainwright,102 upon a finding that Sixth Amendment, through the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, entitles state court 
indigent defendants to court-appointed counsel.103 Gideon would 
become the seminal case on the right to court-appointed counsel.104 
4. Gideon and Its Progeny 
Clarence Earl Gideon was charged with the felony of breaking 
and entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor.105 He 
appeared in court and requested that the court appoint him a 
lawyer because he was unable to afford counsel.106 The judge 
presiding over Mr. Gideon’s case denied his request and stated that 
Florida law only required the court to appoint counsel for an 
indigent criminal defendant in capital cases.107 Mr. Gideon was 
convicted and sentenced, but the Supreme Court granted review to 
reconsider the holding of Betts.108 The Supreme Court noted the 
significant similarities between Mr. Gideon’s case and the Betts 
case in 1942, and concluded that to uphold Betts “would require 
                                                                                                     
counsel where that course seems to be required in the interest of fairness.”). 
 101. See id. at 471 (“[T]he matter [of appointment of counsel] has generally 
been deemed one of legislative policy.”). 
 102. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 103. See id. at 345 (“The Court in Betts v. Brady departed from the sound 
wisdom upon which the Court’s holding in Powell v. Alabama rested . . . . [I]t 
should now be overruled.”). 
 104. See King, supra note 25, at 9 (“[T]he Court . . . eventually establish[ed] 
the categorical right to court-appointed counsel in any serious case in Gideon v. 
Wainwright.”). 
 105. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 32 (stating the charges brought against 
Mr. Gideon in the Florida courts). 
 106. See id. (detailing Mr. Gideon’s initial request for the court to appoint him 
counsel). 
 107. See id. (detailing the Florida judge’s response when Mr. Gideon 
requested that he be appointed counsel for his felony charge). 
 108. See id. (stating the procedural history of Mr. Gideon’s case and the 
reason that the Supreme Court granted his writ of certiorari). 
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rejection of Gideon’s contention that he had a due process 
entitlement to appointed counsel.”109 Instead, the Supreme Court 
held that the Betts Court made a significant error in determining 
that the guarantee of counsel was not a fundamental right made 
obligatory on the states by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.110 In fact, the Court stated that the 
fundamental nature of this right had been first decided years 
earlier in Powell v. Alabama, despite the previous Court’s decision 
to limit the holding.111 The Court chose to ground its argument on 
the basis of comparison: why would governments choose to spend 
vast amounts of money to employ professional prosecutors, unless 
the presence of counsel “was necessary for the proper functioning 
of the legal system?”112 
Gideon marked a further extension of the categorical right of 
indigent criminal defendants to the assistance of counsel and 
returned to the path forged by Powell prior to the Court’s decision 
in Betts.113 Additionally, the Court emphasized that defense 
counsel plays a critical role in ensuring a fair trial for all criminal 
defendants.114 While the Gideon decision marked an important 
turn in the tide for criminal defendants facing serious charges, the 
Court declined to further define when this right could be asserted 
by criminal defendants by failing to specify what constituted a 
“serious criminal charge” entitling a defendant to court-appointed 
counsel.115  
                                                                                                     
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. (stating that the Betts Court erred when it determined that the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel was not a fundamental 
right). 
 111. See id. (“According to the Gideon Court, the fundamental nature of the 
right to counsel had been established in Powell v. Alabama—ten years before 
Betts was decided. Although the Powell Court limited its holding . . . ‘its 
conclusions about the fundamental nature of the right of counsel [were] 
unmistakable.’” (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963))). 
 112. King, supra note 25, at 10. 
 113. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“In returning to 
these old precedents, sounder we believe than the new, we but restore 
constitutional principles established to achieve a fair system of justice.”). 
 114. See id. (“Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require 
us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled 
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless 
counsel is provided for him.”). 
 115. See King, supra note 25, at 10 (“Although the Court again left open the 
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In the absence of clear instructions on how to apply the right 
to court-appointed counsel, state courts and legislatures diverged 
regarding what constituted a “serious crime,” thereby entitling a 
defendant to counsel.116 Later cases defined the contours of the 
right and limited the right to appointed counsel in non-felony 
prosecutions.117  
Argersinger v. Hamlin118 was the Supreme Court’s first 
attempt at refining this right to court-appointed counsel.119 
Petitioner had been charged with carrying a concealed weapon, “an 
offense punishable by imprisonment up to six months, a $1,000 
fine, or both.”120 Petitioner proceeded to trial unrepresented by an 
attorney, was sentenced to serve ninety days in jail, and brought 
his appeal alleging he was deprived of his right to be represented 
by counsel.121 The Court agreed that the trial court denied 
petitioner his Sixth Amendment right and “for the first time 
explicitly expanded the Gideon rule beyond the felony arena.”122 
The Court rationalized this expansion by stating that in almost 
every other context, the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment apply 
to all criminal cases regardless of the seriousness of the charged 
                                                                                                     
precise contours of the right, the Court held that it was an ‘obvious truth’ that 
fairness required that counsel be appointed for any indigent defendant facing a 
serious criminal charge.” (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 
(1963))). 
 116. See id. at 11 (“[S]tate courts and legislatures came to different 
conclusions regarding whether the right was limited to felonies, serious crimes 
(defined in some other way), cases involving the potential for incarceration, cases 
involving actual incarceration, or all criminal cases.” (citing John F. Decker & 
Thomas J. Lorigan, Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. 
Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103, 119–24 (1970) 
(describing the post-Gideon landscape in which thirty-one states had extended 
the holding of Gideon to cover nonfelonies, in some cases including even traffic 
offenses, but in others only involving “serious misdemeanors”)). 
 117. See id. (stating that post-Gideon cases began to refine the application of 
the newly defined constitutional right). 
 118. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
 119. See id. at 31 (“In Gideon v. Wainwright we dealt with a felony trial. But 
we did not so limit the need of the accused for a lawyer.”). 
 120. Id. at 26. 
 121. See id. at 26 (detailing the facts and procedural history that led to the 
writ being issued). 
 122. King, supra note 25, at 11 (citing Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36–40).  
IN THEIR DEFENSE 1763 
crime.123 Yet, despite the broad language of the majority opinion,124 
the Court stopped short of declaring a categorical right to 
appointed counsel in all criminal cases.125 Although many believed 
that the Court would soon recognize such a categorical grant, the 
Court instead halted the expansion of the Counsel Clause seven 
years later in Scott v. Illinois.126 
In Scott, the petitioner, charged and convicted of shoplifting 
merchandise valued at less than $150, was fined $50 after a bench 
trial in which he was not represented by counsel.127 The maximum 
penalty that the petitioner faced was “a $500 fine or one year in 
jail, or both.”128 On appeal, the petitioner argued that Supreme 
Court jurisprudence required the state of Illinois to provide him 
with counsel.129 In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court 
held “that counsel need only be appointed in ‘serious cases,’ which 
the Court defined as those cases that resulted in actual 
incarceration.”130 The opinion evidences the Court’s belief that 
actual incarceration is a punishment different in kind from 
authorized imprisonment or fines, and thus, only a defendant 
facing the former is entitled to the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee 
of the assistance of counsel.131 
                                                                                                     
 123. See id. (explaining the Supreme Court’s decision to expand the right to 
court-appointed counsel beyond felony cases) (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 
U.S. 25, 27–29 (1972)). 
 124. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 33 
The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair trial even 
in a petty-offense prosecution. We are by no means convinced that legal 
and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to 
imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when 
a person can be sent off for six months or more. 
 125. See King, supra note 25, at 12 (stating the Supreme Court’s decision not 
to grant an all-encompassing right to counsel in criminal case). 
 126. 440 U.S. 367 (1979); see also King, supra note 25, at 13 (describing the 
post-Argersinger environment and the Court’s decision to limit the Counsel 
Clause’s reach). 
 127. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 368 (detailing the factual background of the case). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. (stating the grounds for the petitioner’s appeal). 
 130. King, supra note 25, at 13. 
 131. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373 (“[W]e believe that . . . actual imprisonment is 
a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of 
imprisonment . . . [thus] warrant[ing] adoption of actual imprisonment as the line 
defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.”). 
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As American jurisprudence currently stands, an indigent 
state-court criminal defendant is entitled to counsel only if actual 
imprisonment were to follow conviction.132 Every indigent 
defendant facing felony prosecution, “regardless of whether or not 
the defendant is sentenced to incarceration,” must be provided 
counsel.133 Each state has different criteria for determining who 
qualifies as an indigent criminal defendant entitled to 
court-appointed counsel.134 
D. The Right to Counsel of Choice 
In Wheat v. United States,135 the Court expressly recognized 
that the Sixth Amendment also protects a criminal defendant’s 
choice of counsel.136 As Eugene Shapiro aptly stated, “[w]hen, in 
May of 1988, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Sixth 
Amendment encompassed a criminal defendant’s interest in 
retaining counsel of the defendant’s choice, it did so with a tone 
often reserved for statements of the obvious.”137 The petitioner, 
charged with participating in a conspiracy to distribute drugs, 
sought to be represented by his co-defendants’ attorney.138 At a 
hearing for consideration of the issue, the government argued that 
the attorney’s prior representation created a serious conflict of 
interest, and, as a result, the petitioner’s request must be 
                                                                                                     
 132. See id. at 374 (“[T]he Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . require 
only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in 
his defense.”). 
 133. King, supra note 25, at 11 n.64 (citing Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 
419 (2007)). 
 134. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A) (2012) (“Each United States district court, with 
the approval of the judicial council of the circuit, shall place in operation 
throughout the district a plan for furnishing representation for any person 
financially unable to obtain adequate representation in accordance with this 
section.”). 
 135. 486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
 136. See id. at 164 (“The District Court must recognize a presumption in favor 
of petitioner’s counsel of choice.”). 
 137. Eugene L. Shapiro, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice: An 
Exercise in the Weighing of Unarticulated Values, 43 S.C. L. REV. 345, 345 (1991). 
 138. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 155 (detailing the factual background and 
petitioner’s request that Eugene Iredale, attorney for petitioner’s co-defendants, 
represent him as well). 
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denied.139 The trial court denied the petitioner’s request for 
counsel.140 The petitioner then proceeded to trial, where he was 
convicted and thereafter appealed his conviction on the ground 
that he was denied his counsel of choice.141 The Court accepted the 
petitioner’s claim that the Sixth Amendment provides for the 
disqualification of a retained attorney because of a possible conflict 
of interest.142 The Court devoted little time to discussing the 
acceptance of such a right, and instead focused on the scope of that 
right “and the process by which the presumption in favor of 
defendant’s counsel of choice might be outweighed.”143 
The Court stated that this right was “circumscribed” and 
proceeded to discuss the ways in which this right could be 
overcome by other interests.144 For example, the presumption in 
favor of counsel of choice is overcome if a defendant seeks an 
attorney who is not admitted by the bar, who he cannot afford, or 
who declines to represent him.145 Additionally, “a defendant [may 
not] insist on the counsel of an attorney who has a previous or 
ongoing relationship with an opposing party, even when the 
opposing party is the Government.”146 The opinion articulated a 
list of limitations on the right to counsel that evolved into a 
balancing test for determining what types of interferences would 
be permissible.147 Wheat requires courts to weigh the particular 
facts and interests in each case to determine the strength of a 
                                                                                                     
 139. See Shapiro, supra note 137, at 349 (detailing the government’s position 
on petitioner’s request for Eugene Iredale’s counsel). 
 140. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 157 (stating the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s 
request of counsel). 
 141. See id. (detailing the procedural history of petitioner’s claim that he was 
denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice). 
 142. See Shapiro, supra note 137, at 345 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
acceptance of a right to counsel of choice under the Sixth Amendment).  
 143. Id. 
 144. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (“The Sixth 
Amendment right to choose one’s own counsel is circumscribed in several 
important respects.”). 
 145. See Shapiro, supra note 137, at 347–48 (stating the ways in which a 
criminal defendant may not be entitled to his choice of counsel). 
 146. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159. 
 147. See Shapiro, supra note 137, at 348 (explaining the practical effect of the 
Court’s decision to limit a defendant’s right to choice of counsel in circumstances 
where other interests are implicated). 
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defendant’s claim for their choice of counsel.148 Consequently, the 
trial court retains discretion to disqualify a defendant’s counsel if 
the circumstances warrant it.149 Although Wheat requires a 
balancing in favor of a defendant’s choice of counsel against 
competing interests, the Court provided little instruction on the 
strength of that presumption or how government interests should 
be viewed in light of the presumption.150 
As counsel of choice jurisprudence currently stands, there is a 
presumption in favor of a criminal defendant’s choice that can be 
overcome by the interests of fairness or other conflicting 
government interests.151 The Court has recognized the demands of 
the court’s calendar as one such relevant government interest.152 
This interest is potentially implicated by an indigent criminal 
defendant’s motion to fire currently retained counsel and seek 
court-appointed counsel as it could require a continuance of 
previously scheduled hearings or trial. Additionally, although not 
explicitly stated in the counsel of choice cases, the Government 
could attempt to assert an interest in lowering costs when a 
criminal defendant who has already personally retained counsel 
moves to dismiss said counsel and have the government pay for a 
court-appointed attorney. 
An important and large subset of criminal defendants do not 
enjoy the same right to counsel of choice as do other criminal 
defendants: indigent defendants represented by court-appointed 
                                                                                                     
 148. See id. (“Wheat seems to require a careful weighing of the particularized 
facts and interests in each case.”). 
 149. See id. (“This weighing process led the Wheat Court to conclude that the 
disqualification of counsel was within the trial court’s discretion.”). 
 150. See id. at 350 (stating the limited instruction provided by the Court in 
Wheat regarding how to balance the presumption in favor of the defendant’s 
choice and the Government’s interests). 
 151. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006) (“[T]he 
right to counsel of choice ‘is circumscribed in several important respects.’” 
(quoting Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159)). 
 152. See id. at 152 (“We have recognized a trial court’s wide latitude in 
balancing the right to counsel of choice against . . . the demands of its calendar.” 
(citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1983))). 
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counsel from the outset.153 In Morris v. Slappy154 the Court rejected 
the claim that “the Sixth Amendment guarantees a ‘meaningful 
relationship’ between an accused and his counsel.”155 This decision 
was in response to a defendant’s desire to substitute his 
court-appointed counsel after the two had become “embroiled in 
irreconcilable conflict.”156 The Court stated that effective 
assistance of counsel is all that is required by the Sixth 
Amendment and found that Mr. Slappy was assisted by an 
effective attorney.157 In short, as the Court later explained, “the 
appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the 
accused’s relationship with his lawyer as such. If counsel is a 
reasonably effective advocate, he meets constitutional standards 
irrespective of his client’s evaluation of his performance.”158 
III. The Conflict of Multiple Rights’ Assertion 
The right to hire and fire retained counsel159 as well as the 
right to court-appointed counsel for qualifying indigent 
defendants160 are protected by the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee 
                                                                                                     
 153. See Janet C. Hoeffel, Toward a More Robust Right to Counsel of Choice, 
44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 545, 528 (2007) (“For indigent defendants, since they have 
no right to counsel of choice, a trial court can deny a defendant’s motion to 
continue the trial in order to allow his appointed counsel to stay on the case, 
thereby serving an ongoing attorney relationship.”). A more recent and 
particularly pertinent Supreme Court decision, Gonzalez-Lopez, explicitly states 
that “the right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require 
counsel to be appointed for them.” Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 151.  
 154. 461 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 155. Id. at 14. 
 156. Id. at 4. 
 157. See id. at 14 
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel “would be without substance if it did not include the right to a 
meaningful attorney-client relationship,” is without basis in the law. 
No authority was cited for this novel ingredient of the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of counsel, and of course none could be. 
(citations omitted). 
 158. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (1984). 
 159. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006) (“The 
right to select counsel of one’s choice . . . has been regarded as the root meaning 
of the constitutional guarantee [of the Sixth Amendment].”). 
 160. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[I]n our adversary 
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of assistance of counsel.161 Because both rights, as well as several 
others, are constitutionally protected under the Sixth Amendment, 
courts must know the proper procedure for handling a case when 
these two rights are simultaneously asserted by a criminal 
defendant.  
In 2004, the First Circuit addressed the issue of a criminal 
defendant wishing to fire retained counsel and seek 
court-appointed counsel.162 The First Circuit articulated a 
standard which required a defendant to show good cause in order 
to substitute retained counsel for court-appointed counsel and thus 
to enjoy both of their Sixth Amendment rights.163 Eleven years 
later, and without reference to the First Circuit’s opinion, the 
Ninth Circuit stated that a criminal defendant has the right to 
discharge retained counsel for any reason or for no reason at all 
and that the court is then obligated by § 3006A(b) to appoint the 
defendant a new attorney to represent the defendant.164 Shortly 
thereafter, the Eleventh Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead 
by expressly rejecting the good cause showing required by the First 
Circuit.165 In order to understand the differing circuits’ 
justifications, it is necessary to take a closer look at each case 
contributing to the split, beginning with the First Circuit’s 
decision.  
                                                                                                     
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a 
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”). 
 161. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
 162. See United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(stating the defendant’s motion to dismiss personally retained counsel and to then 
have the court appoint new counsel). 
 163. See id. at 48 (“A defendant ‘must show that the conflict between lawyer 
and client was so profound as to cause a total breakdown in communication,’ 
preventing an adequate defense.” (quoting United States v. Myers, 294 F.3d 203, 
208 (1st Cir. 2002))). 
 164. See United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1344–46 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(stating that a financially qualified criminal defendant has the right to fire 
retained counsel and that the court is then obligated by federal law to appoint the 
defendant counsel). 
 165. See United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1271–72 (11th 
Cir. 2016) (“We agree with those courts that have held that a defendant may 
discharge his retained counsel without regard to whether he will later request 
appointed counsel . . . . We reject the view of the First Circuit, which applied the 
standard of good cause in this circumstance.”). 
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A. United States v. Mota-Santana 
On July 31, 2002, Enrique Mota-Santana was indicted for 
“conspiring with two co-defendants to import cocaine and heroin 
into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 over a two 
year period, beginning in late 2000.”166 Initially, Mr. 
Mota-Santana refused court-appointed counsel and employed 
counsel retained by his family.167 On December 4, 2002, Mr. 
Mota-Santana and his counsel, Raymond Sanchez, reviewed and 
accepted a plea agreement offered by the government for him to 
plead guilty to Count One of his indictment; the government would 
then recommend a particular sentence and dismiss the second 
charge.168 
On December 6, 2002, Mr. Mota-Santana submitted a motion 
for change of plea and six days later his counsel filed a request to 
withdraw as counsel.169 Mr. Sanchez’s request detailed his 
conversations with Mr. Mota-Santana following the entry of the 
plea and Mr. Mota-Santana’s dissatisfaction with his lawyer’s 
failure to negotiate a better plea.170 Following a change of plea 
hearing on December 16, 2002, Mr. Mota-Santana once again told 
the court he wished to plead guilty to Count One and that he was 
satisfied with his attorney’s services.171 At this time, “the court 
concluded that he was acting ‘voluntarily and with full knowledge 
                                                                                                     
 166. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 43. 
 167. See id. at 44 (discussing the defendant’s history with counsel following 
his indictment). Mr. Mota-Santana later replaced his initial lawyer with newly 
retained counsel, Raymond Sanchez-Maceira. Id.  
 168. See id. (stating the details of the December 4, 2002 plea agreement 
offered to Mr. Mota-Santana by the government). The plea agreement stipulated 
that Mr. Mota-Santana was “satisfied with counsel, that he was familiar with the 
rights he was surrendering, that his agreement was voluntary, and that he had 
reviewed every part of the agreement with his attorney and understood it.” Id. 
 169. See id. (stating the events following the accepted plea deal which 
culminated in Mr. Sanchez’s request to withdraw as counsel for Mr. 
Mota-Santana). 
 170. See id. (stating Mr. Sanchez’s request to withdraw as counsel and 
describing the interactions between himself and Mr. Mota-Santana following the 
entry of the plea deal). 
 171. See id. (“On resumption of the hearing, defendant told the court he had 
enough time to consult with his attorney, that he wished to enter a plea of guilty 
to Count One, and that he was satisfied with his services.”). 
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of the consequences.’”172 In January 2003, Mr. Mota-Santana filed 
a pro se motion to appoint counsel asserting that his family could 
no longer afford to pay his counsel’s fees and further detailing his 
displeasure with Mr. Sanchez’s services.173 
On February 14, 2003, Mr. Sanchez filed a response to Mr. 
Mota-Santana’s motion.174 However, Mr. Sanchez also stated “that 
the breakdown in communication between him and his client 
threatened the latter’s Sixth Amendment rights and that new 
counsel should be appointed.”175 On February 26, 2003, the district 
court denied Mr. Mota-Santana’s motion to appoint counsel.176 At 
the sentencing hearing on April 3, 2003, Mr. Mota-Santana was 
sentenced to 120 months in prison.177 
On appeal, Mr. Mota-Santana challenged the court’s failure to 
determine if a conflict of interest existed between himself and Mr. 
Sanchez after he asked Mr. Sanchez to withdraw and requested 
the court appoint new counsel.178 Mr. Mota-Santana contended 
                                                                                                     
 172. Id. at 45 (citation omitted). 
 173. See id. (“[Mr. Mota-Santana stated] that on December 30 and 31 he had 
tried unsuccessfully to call Sanchez, that Sanchez had ‘deceived’ him into signing 
a plea agreement that was not fully explained to him, and that he had lost all 
confidence in Sanchez.”). 
 174. See id. 
[Mr. Sanchez detailed] that he said paid several visits to defendant; 
that he had requested and received considerable discovery; that he had 
filed a motion to suppress a tape and had participated in a hearing to 
determine its acceptability; that plea negotiations had been 
complicated by three factors—defendant's role, drug amounts, and 
another case in which supervised release might be jeopardized; and 
that defendant was well aware of the plea provisions and had not been 
deceived. 
Mr. Sanchez stated that his fees had been fully paid and that no further fees were 
being charged and further described his efforts in the case and contacts with Mr. 
Mota-Santana. See id. (detailing Mr. Sanchez’s required response to Mr. 
Mota-Santana’s pro se motion). Mr. Sanchez also explained that he had visited 
defendant several times and that the defendant was fully aware of the plea 
provisions and had not been deceived. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. (“On February 26, the court endorsed an order denying the motion 
to appoint counsel.”). 
 177. See id. (detailing the events of Mr. Mota-Santana’s sentencing hearing). 
Additionally, at this hearing Mr. Mota-Santana declined the court’s invitation 
when asked if there was anything he would like to state to the court. See id. 
(describing the events of the sentencing hearing). 
 178. See id. (articulating the question presented to the First Circuit on 
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that this case involved “a per se denial of [his] Sixth Amendment 
rights and requires reversal without any obligation to show 
prejudice.”179 Mr. Mota-Santana was unable to persuade the First 
Circuit, which found the alleged conflict to be minimal.180 The 
court stated that Mr. Mota-Santana attempted to stretch the 
concept of “conflict of interests” beyond its permissible bounds, 
when in actuality his relationship with Mr. Sanchez implicated no 
more than a mere, unremarkable disagreement.181 The court also 
took issue with Mr. Mota-Santana’s claim that he was entitled to 
reversal without an obligation to show prejudice.182 Consequently, 
                                                                                                     
appeal). Mr. Mota-Santana argues that he accused Mr. Sanchez of failing to 
properly represent him and that there had been a complete breakdown in 
communications between the two. See id. (describing Mr. Mota-Santana’s 
appellate argument). Mr. Mota-Santana further argued that the case contained a 
conflict of interest which requires an inquiry to resolve the issue and that the 
district court failed to hold such an inquiry, but instead proceeded with the 
change of plea hearing. See id. (explaining Mr. Mota-Santana’s argument on 
appeal). 
 179. Id.  
 180. See id. at 46 (“The alleged conflict . . . was not [an] uncommon type of 
disagreement between client and counsel, exacerbated by regret that a more 
favorable plea agreement could not somehow have been made.”). 
 181. See id. (describing the concept of “conflict of interests” and stating that 
all relevant cases deal with multiple representation situations where a lawyer 
has two or more clients in the same event or transaction). 
 182. See id. (discussing Mr. Mota-Santana’s reliance on Holloway v. 
Arkansas, clarified by Mickens v. Taylor,  535 U.S. 162 (2002), as requiring 
reversal “‘only where defense counsel is forced to represent codefendants over his 
timely objection, unless the trial court has determined that there is no conflict’” 
(quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168 (2002))). In 2002, the Supreme 
Court stated that “a defendant must show a defective, though not necessarily 
outcome-affecting, performance by counsel.” Id. The Court also addressed courts 
of appeal that have applied the required judicial inquiry for conflict of interest 
cases to situations in which representation of the defendant implicates counsel’s 
person or financial interests rather than joint representation. See id. (stating the 
Court’s policy with regard to judicial inquiries in varying cases of conflict of 
interests). The Court noted that such an expansive application of the inquiry 
requirement is not expressly required by applicable case law. See id. (noting that 
the language of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, (1980), which requires judicial 
inquiry into conflicts of interest cases, does not require or even support such a 
broad understanding of conflict). The First Circuit explained that if it were to 
treat disagreements between attorney and client in the same manner as conflicts 
arising from multiple representation, any unsuccessful criminal defendants 
would likely attempt to produce some disagreement with their counsel. See id. 
(considering the practical implications of permitting automatic reversal for 
criminal defendants who can show that their counsel’s representation of them 
implicates counsel’s personal or financial interests). 
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the court declined Mr. Mota-Santana’s proposal to treat this case 
as presenting notice of a potential conflict of interest necessitating 
a special inquiry and potential reversal.183 
The court framed Mr. Mota-Santana’s case as presenting two 
distinct actions of the court: “its refusal to allow Sanchez to 
withdraw and its refusal to appoint substitute counsel.”184 The 
court stated that if Mr. Mota-Santana’s only argument was the 
appropriateness of the district court’s refusal to permit Mr. 
Sanchez to withdraw, then there might have been a legitimate 
question.185 “But here the two actions merge,” as Mr. 
Mota-Santana was unable to pay to retain other private counsel, 
but still sought court-appointed counsel.186 In evaluating the 
sufficiency of the district court’s inquiry, the First Circuit 
stipulated that judicial inquiries need not amount to a formal 
hearing, but instead merely require satisfaction of a number of 
stated objectives.187 The court analogized this case to United States 
v. Allen188 and stated that “‘[g]ood cause for substitution of counsel 
cannot be determined solely according to the subjective standard 
                                                                                                     
 183. See id. (stating the court’s refusal to treat Mr. Mota-Santana’s case as 
one containing a legitimate notice of conflicts of interest). The court further stated 
that differences between a client and their counsel can be so deep and pervasive 
that effective legal assistance would be impaired to require relief from the court, 
but that this is not one of those case. See id. (qualifying Mr. Mota-Santana’s claim 
of conflict of interests in the grander scheme of client-attorney conflict). 
 184. Id. at 46–47. 
 185. See id. (articulating the court’s primary problem with Mr. 
Mota-Santana’s appellate claim). The court explained that if Mr. Mota-Santana 
challenged only the district court’s refusal to allow Mr. Sanchez to withdraw then 
it would be controlled by United States v. Woodard, 291 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2002). 
See id. (“As we said in United States v. Woodard . . . a defendant is not ordinarily 
dependent on the court’s permission to replace retained counsel.”). 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. 
The appellate court should consider several factors, including the 
timeliness of the motion, the adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the 
defendant’s complaint, and whether the conflict between the defendant 
and his counsel was so great that is resulted in a total lack of 
communication preventing an adequate defense. 
The court set aside the timeliness issue as not having been advanced as a 
challenge and proceeds with the suggested analysis. See id. (disregarding the 
consideration of timeliness and proceeding with evaluating Mr. Mota-Santana’s 
reason for dissatisfaction). 
 188. 789 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1986). 
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of what the defendant perceives,’” thus articulating the 
requirement of an objective “good cause” showing.189 In its analysis 
the court noted Mr. Mota-Santana’s initial reason for 
dissatisfaction, but qualified that reason as being inadequate for 
purposes of determining that new counsel ought to be appointed.190 
The court further responded to each of Mr. Mota-Santana’s 
complaints and accusations by discounting or disproving each.191 
Following its analysis the court concluded that if there was a 
breakdown in communication between Mr. Mota-Santana and Mr. 
Sanchez then it was the doing of the defendant.192 The court 
explained that “a defendant cannot compel a change to [sic] counsel 
by the device of refusing to talk with his lawyer,” and thus Mr. 
Mota-Santana did not have a valid claim concerning breakdown in 
communication.193 Finally, the court addressed whether the 
disagreements at issue were likely to preclude effective legal 
assistance in the defense.194 The court concluded that the work of 
Mr. Sanchez was practically at its end and the only remaining 
work would be that of appellate work, a service beyond the scope 
of the request for substitute counsel.195 
                                                                                                     
 189. United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Allen, 789 F.2d at 93). 
 190. See id. 
[T]he initial reason for dissatisfaction [was] . . . that he thought 
counsel should have obtained a more favorable plea agreement offer 
from the government . . . . [but] “[t]he mere fact that a defense attorney 
and his client disagreed about the advisability of a plea does not justify 
appointing new counsel.” 
(quoting United States v. Genao, 281 F.3d 305, 313 (1st Cir. 2002)). 
 191. See id. at 47–48. (discounting Mr. Mota-Santana’s accusation that Mr. 
Sanchez deceived him, the complaint that Mr. Sanchez was unavailable and 
unreachable, and the assertion that Mr. Mota-Santana and Mr. Sanchez 
experienced a total breakdown in communication). The court stated that to prove 
a complete breakdown in communication “a defendant ‘must show that the 
conflict between lawyer and client was so profound as to cause a total breakdown 
in communication,’ preventing an adequate defense.” Id. at 48.  
 192. See id. (stating the court’s belief that if a breakdown occurred, it was the 
doing of Mr. Mota-Santana). 
 193. Id. 
 194. See id. (introducing the court’s final inquiry into Mr. Mota-Santana’s 
appellate case). 
 195. See id. (concluding that Mr. Mota-Santana was not deprived of effective 
legal assistance because Mr. Sanchez had already finished all the legal work he 
needed to complete). 
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In conclusion, the First Circuit determined that the district 
court gave adequate attention to Mr. Mota-Santana’s motions, 
made appropriate inquiries into the causes and merits of the 
complaints, and “was well within its discretion in refusing to 
appoint new counsel.”196 Due to Mr. Mota-Santana’s inability to 
supply a good cause rationale for his request to terminate retained 
counsel and seek court-appointed counsel, he was denied reversal 
of his conviction and the opportunity to have his counsel of choice. 
B. United States v. Brown 
Eleven years later, in United States v. Brown,197 the Ninth 
Circuit addressed an indigent criminal defendant’s request to 
substitute retained counsel for court-appointed counsel, and the 
court decided the case without reference to the First Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Mota-Santana.198 In fact, the court 
began its opinion directly contradicting the First Circuit’s decision 
by stating: “United States v. Rivera-Corona . . . held that an 
indigent criminal defendant need not establish a conflict with his 
attorney amounting to the constructive denial of counsel as a 
prerequisite to substituting appointed counsel for his retained 
attorney.”199 
The defendant, Mr. Brown, was charged with one count each 
of advertising child pornography, receiving child pornography, and 
possessing child pornography.200 Two and a half weeks prior to the 
start of trial, Mr. Brown’s retained counsel filed a motion to 
withdraw and for the court to substitute a court-appointed public 
defender to the case.201 Subsequently, the district court held a 
                                                                                                     
 196. Id. 
 197. 785 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 198. Id.; United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 199. Brown, F.3d at 1340 (citing United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 
976, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 200. See id. (describing the charges against Mr. Brown). 
 201. See id. at 1341 (stating the retained defense counsel’s motion to 
withdraw from the case prior to trial). Mr. Brown’s lawyer stated there were 
“‘strained’ communications and an ‘actual conflict of interest’ with Brown.” Id. 
Mr. Brown’s counsel further informed the court that Mr. Brown wished for 
counsel to withdraw and attached an email in which Mr. Brown had specifically 
requested the withdrawal and stated his intention to seek appointed counsel. See 
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hearing on Mr. Brown’s counsel’s motion to withdraw.202 Following 
conversations with both Mr. Brown and his counsel, the court 
denied the motion.203 Mr. Brown was convicted at trial and “filed a 
motion for judgment of acquittal or for a new trial, based in part 
on the court’s denial of his attorney’s motion to withdraw.”204 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of the appeal by 
distinguishing Mr. Brown’s case from that of an indigent criminal 
defendant seeking substitute counsel for his current 
court-appointed counsel.205 Mr. Brown, “who has hired his own 
                                                                                                     
id. (detailing Mr. Brown’s lawyer’s motion to withdraw from representation).  
 202. Id. The hearing began when Mr. Brown’s counsel informed the court of 
the extreme difference in opinion as to how to handle the case between himself 
and Mr. Brown. Id. The trial judge asked Mr. Brown if he had an objection to his 
lawyer’s motion to withdrawal and he indicated that he did not. Id. The judge 
proceeded to explain that if it decided to appoint a public defender then it would 
require a continuance of the trial so that the new counsel could be brought up to 
speed. Id. The judge further stated that he found fault with counsel’s late filing 
of the motion and the faulty base of the motion, specifically the disagreement over 
payment and an inability, or unwillingness, of counsel to prepare for trial. Id. 
Counsel responded that the disagreement was not over payment and he was 
ready to proceed to trial, at which time the judge engaged Mr. Brown. Id. Mr. 
Brown advised the judge that defense counsel was never receptive to Mr. Brown’s 
desire to present a defense, but instead focused on a potential plea deal. Id. at 
1342. The judge again addressed Mr. Brown’s counsel and reminded him of Mr. 
Brown’s control of the defense, restricted by counsel’s ethical duties. Id. 
 203. See id. at 1343 (denying Mr. Brown’s counsel’s motion to withdraw). The 
judge explained to Mr. Brown that his lawyer was well qualified, that the case 
was prepared for trial, and that the court would permit the defense extra time 
before trial if need be. Id. Further, the judge explained to Mr. Brown that having 
paid counsel $50,000, he could not expect nearly as good a defense if the court 
were to appoint a public defender. Id. 
 204. Id. The appeal followed Mr. Brown’s sentencing, during which he was 
sentenced to “concurrent 180-month sentences on each of the advertising, 
transportation, and receipt counts, and a concurrent 180-month sentence for the 
possession account.” Id.  
 205. See id. (stating that when the court has appointed an attorney for an 
indigent criminal defendant, the defendant does not have a right to any specific 
lawyer appointed and paid for by the court, but rather a right to effective counsel). 
The court further explained that when an indigent defendant represented by 
counsel seeks appointment of new counsel the inquiry is “when the conflict 
between client and counsel is so extreme as to constitute a ‘constructive denial of 
counsel’ altogether.” Id. (quoting United States v. River-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 
979 (9th Cir. 2010)). Such an inquiry involves consideration of the timeliness of 
the motion and the extent of resulting inconvenience or delay, the adequacy of the 
district court’s inquiry into the motion, and whether the conflict between the 
counsel and client was so great that it impaired an adequate defense (good cause); 
these are the inquiries that the district court made in Mr. Brown’s case. Id. 
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attorney ‘has a different right, independent and distinct from the 
right to effective counsel, to be represented by the attorney of his 
choice.’”206 The court stated that Mr. Brown’s right to counsel of his 
choice is the core of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee and denial 
of this right does not depend on the quality of representation that 
Mr. Brown received.207 Although the right to counsel of choice is 
not absolute, generally a defendant will be permitted to have 
counsel of his choice unless a different result is necessitated by 
“‘purposes inherent in the fair, efficient, and orderly 
administration of justice.’”208 The court clarified that the degree of 
conflict analysis employed by the district court is inappropriate 
when the court considers a defendant’s motion to discharge his 
retained counsel and to be represented by court-appointed 
counsel.209 Instead, this right implicates Mr. Brown’s right to 
counsel of choice.210 To be sure, this is not the same right to counsel 
of choice that a defendant enjoys if they seek to replace retained 
counsel with different retained counsel, but rather the right to a 
court-appointed lawyer in lieu of currently retained counsel.211 In 
this context, Mr. Brown’s right to counsel of choice meant that he 
had a right to fire his retained lawyer for any or no reason.212 
                                                                                                     
 206. Id. (quoting United States v. Mendez-Sanchez, 563 F.3d 935, 979 (9th 
Cir. 2009)). 
 207. See id. at 1344 (describing the importance of the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel of choice stated in Gonzalez-Lopez). 
 208. Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 
2010)). 
 209. See id. (stating that a defendant’s motion to substitute court-appointed 
counsel for retained counsel does not require an inquiry into conflict between the 
counsel and their defendant). 
 210. See id. (stating that Mr. Brown’s motion to substitute counsel implicates 
his qualified right to counsel of choice protected by the Sixth Amendment). 
 211. See id. (qualifying the right to counsel of choice for indigent defendants 
seeking court-appointed counsel as substitute counsel for retained counsel). 
 212. See id. (explaining that an indigent criminal defendant has discretion to 
fire their retained counsel based on the right to counsel of choice). The 
Government argued that United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 
2010) did not control this case because the defense attorney there involved had 
demanded additional legal fees. Id. The court corrected the Government: 
“[Rivera-Corona] considered, in general, ‘the standard for considering a criminal 
defendant’s motion to discharge his privately retained counsel and to proceed 
with a different, court-appointed lawyer instead,’ and concluded that, under those 
circumstances, the defendant enjoys a Sixth Amendment right to discharge his 
retained counsel.” Id. (quoting Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 977–81). 
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The court separated the actions implicated in Mr. Brown’s 
case:  
When a court denies a motion to substitute appointed for 
retained counsel, as the district court did in this case, it is really 
deciding two issues. The first, whether the defendant 
may discharge the attorney whom he retained, implicates 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice, as discussed 
above. But the court ruling on such a motion is, at the same 
time, also considering a request for appointment of 
counsel. And, while a criminal defendant's right to appointed 
counsel of course does have a constitutional aspect, in federal 
court the question whether counsel should be appointed is 
governed, first and foremost, by the [Criminal Justice Act], 18 
U.S.C. § 3006A.213 
Clearly Mr. Brown’s case involved intertwined issues, the crux of 
which was whether he would be permitted to fire retained 
counsel.214 If the Ninth Circuit permits Mr. Brown to fire his 
retained counsel then the Criminal Justice Act requires that the 
court appoint him counsel unless he wishes to proceed pro se.215 
The government maintained that the court needed to consider 
several factors, including the magnitude of the conflict or break in 
communication between the lawyer and client.216 The court framed 
this proposal as the government seeking to add a prerequisite to 
Mr. Brown’s constitutional right to discharge his retained 
counsel—the court rejected the prerequisite.217 The Ninth Circuit 
                                                                                                     
 213. Id. at 1344–45 (citations omitted).  
 214. See id. at 1345 (explaining the primary issue implicating Mr. Brown’s 
constitutional rights). 
 215. See id. (stating that if Mr. Brown is permitted to discharge his retained 
counsel, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) requires the court to appoint counsel unless he 
wishes to exercise his right to represent himself). The Criminal Justice Act 
provides that “‘[i]n every case in which a person entitled to 
representation . . . appears without counsel . . . the court, if satisfied after 
appropriate inquiry that the person is financially unable to obtain counsel, shall 
appoint counsel to represent him’ unless that right is waived.” Id. (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (2012)). 
 216. See id. (stating the Government’s proposed factors for consideration in 
determining whether a defendant may substitute appointed for retained counsel). 
 217. See id. at 1346 (“[T]he government would have us hold that, 
notwithstanding Brown’s constitutional right to discharge his lawyer, the 
restrictive extent-of-conflict analysis governs whether a replacement is 
appointed. We disagree.”). The court further stated that the proposed relevant 
factors were “essentially identical to the extent-of-conflict analysis applicable to 
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again referred to Rivera-Corona and stated: “[w]here, as here, the 
right to retained counsel of choice is implicated, Rivera-Corona 
specifically held that ‘the extent-of-conflict review is 
inappropriate.’”218 Instead, Rivera-Corona answers the 
constitutional question of how and when an indigent defendant 
may fire retained counsel and substitute court-appointed counsel: 
“‘for any reason,’ subject to only the orderly administration of 
justice qualification.”219 Mr. Brown is not required to make any 
showing or comply with judicially-created requirements in order to 
discharge retained counsel and then receive court-appointed 
counsel required by the Criminal Justice Act.220 
The Ninth Circuit supported its holding that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying Mr. Brown’s motion to discharge 
his retained counsel by reframing the issue as one of criminal 
defendants’ rights.221 The district court focused on the attorney’s 
reasons for the motion to withdraw, but this motion was primarily 
about Mr. Brown trying to fire his lawyer.222 Instead, “where, as 
here, it is apparent that the defendant, not the attorney, instigated 
the withdrawal motion, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights 
should trump whatever concerns the court has about the lawyer’s 
motives.”223 Mr. Brown’s complaints about his counsel concerned: 
                                                                                                     
replacement of one appointed counsel by another” as in Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 
1276 (2012). Id. (citing Martel, 132 S. Ct. at 1287). 
 218. Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 
2010)). 
 219. Id. (quoting Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 980). 
 220. See id. (stating that Mr. Brown need not satisfy a showing before 
receiving permission to discharge retain counsel and be appointed counsel under 
18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)). 
 221. See id. at 1347 (stating the court’s holding that the district court abused 
its discretion in denying Mr. Brown’s motion). 
 222. See id. (describing the district court’s error in dedicating the motions 
hearing to the attorney’s reasons for withdrawing from the case when it ought to 
have focused on Mr. Brown’s rights). The court stated that when the district court 
considered the motion to withdraw their “responsibility was not to ensure a fair 
attorney-client relationship or to supervise the conduct of the lawyer,” and stated 
that those considerations “are relevant and important . . . when a court considers 
a lawyer’s motion to withdraw.” Id. (citing Brandon v. Blech, 560 F.3d 536, 537–
39 (6th Cir. 2009)). 
 223. Id. The district court was aware that Mr. Brown initiated the withdrawal 
motion based on the email attached to the motion, from Mr. Brown to his counsel 
regarding his desire to discharge counsel, and the subsequent statements made 
by Mr. Brown during the motions hearing. Id. 
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(1) a difference in opinion as to how the case should be handled and 
a lack of trust; (2) dissatisfaction with the infrequent contact 
between the two; and (3) financial tensions resulting from Mr. 
Brown’s difficulty collecting money for the last payment.224  
The court stated that any one of these reasons was more than 
sufficient to support Mr. Brown’s desire to discharge retained 
counsel.225 In fact, Mr. Brown’s reasons for wishing to discharge 
his retained counsel were not the court’s concern at all—“[h]e had 
the right to ‘fire his retained . . . lawyer . . . for any reason or [for] 
no reason.’”226 The court further states that “[o]nly affirmative 
interference with the ‘fair, efficient and orderly administration of 
justice,’ could have justified an order that Brown could not 
discharge his lawyer.”227 The court concluded, after review of the 
district court’s record concerning reasons to deny Mr. Brown’s 
motion to promote the administration of justice, that no such 
reasons existed.228 The court further concluded that “[Mr.] Brown’s 
motion to discharge his retained counsel should have been 
granted,” and “[a]s [Mr.] Brown met the financial requirements for 
an appointed lawyer, he was entitled to one . . . .”229 
                                                                                                     
 224. See id. at 1348 (summarizing Mr. Brown’s complaints addressed briefly 
at the district court’s motions hearing). 
 225. See id. (“In the context of the constitutional right to discharge a retained 
lawyer, any of these concerns was more than sufficient.”). 
 226. Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 
2010) (alteration in original omitted) (emphasis added)).  
 227. Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 
2010) (citation omitted)). The Government suggested in its briefing that the 
district court denied Mr. Brown’s motion because of the possibility of delay 
associated with allowing discharge and appointment of new counsel, a rationale 
relevant to the “fair, efficient and orderly administration of justice.” Id. at 1349. 
The court conceded that the district court has broad discretion to balance the right 
to discharge retained counsel with the demands of the court calendar. Id. Despite 
this discretion, the court found that the district court in this case did not deny the 
motion based on time constraint nor would that rationale qualify as an 
“administration-of-justice” basis for the denial of Mr. Brown’s right to discharge 
retained counsel. Id. The court offered three reasons for this finding: (1) the 
district court never justified its denial of the motion by concern for its calendar; 
(2) the district court’s offer to continue the case directly contradicts the suggestion 
that it was denied to avoid delay; and (3) the district court did not attempt to 
determine how long newly appointed counsel would need to be prepared for trial. 
Id.  
 228. See id. at 1350 (concluding that the district court did not have any 
administration-of-justice rationale for denying Mr. Brown’s motion). 
 229. Id. 
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In terms of remedy, the court stated that the denial of Mr. 
Brown’s right to counsel of choice qualified as a structural error, 
“requiring that convictions be vacated even without a showing of 
prejudice.”230 Therefore, the denial of Mr. Brown’s motion 
constituted denial of his right to counsel of choice and the court 
vacated his convictions.231 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brown 
not to require indigent criminal defendants to satisfy an objective 
good cause showing prior to dismissal of retained counsel provided 
the foundation for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States 
v. Jimenez-Antunez232 just one year later.233 The Eleventh Circuit 
relied heavily on Brown, in addition to several lower court 
decisions, in concluding that Mr. Jimenez-Antunez did not need to 
show good cause in order to substitute appointed counsel for his 
retained counsel.234 
C. United States v. Jimenez-Antunez 
On June 4, 2013, Gabriel Jimenez-Antunez was indicted for 
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 
grams of methamphetamine, possession of 500 grams of 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, conspiracy to commit 
money laundering, and illegal reentry after deportation.235 
Following the indictment, Mr. Joshi entered a notice of appearance 
as Mr. Jimenez-Antunez’s retained counsel.236 On October 24, 
                                                                                                     
 230. Id. (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006)). 
 231. See id. (“Accordingly, because Brown’s motion to substitute counsel 
should have been granted, Brown was denied his right to counsel of choice and 
we must vacate his convictions.”). 
 232. 820 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 233. See id. at 1271 (citing affirmatively Brown as support for the court’s 
decision not to require a good cause showing). 
 234. See id. (stating that an indigent criminal defendant, while not seeking 
counsel of choice is constitutionally permitted to fire his retained counsel for any 
reason or for no reason at all). 
 235. See id. at 1269 (stating the grand jury’s indictments of Mr. 
Jimenez-Antunez). 
 236. See id. (describing the inception of Mr. Joshi and Mr. Jimenez-Antunez’s 
relationship). With the help of Mr. Joshi, Mr. Jimenez-Antunez “negotiated a plea 
agreement with the government and pleaded guilty to the two conspiracy 
charges.” Id. Mr. Jimenez-Antunez’s sentencing hearing was set for January 6, 
2015. Id. at 1270. 
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2014, Mr. Jimenez-Antunez sent a letter to Mr. Joshi expressing 
his desire to discharge Mr. Joshi and intention to seek 
court-appointed counsel.237 Thereafter, Mr. Joshi filed a motion to 
withdraw as defense counsel and advised the court of Mr. 
Jimenez-Antunez’s intention to substitute court-appointed 
counsel.238 Upon hearing Mr. Jimenez-Antunez’s complaints in 
court, “[t]he district court concluded that [Mr. Jimenez-Antunez] 
‘[had] been afforded effective counsel’ and denied the motion.”239 
Mr. Jimenez-Antunez was sentenced to two terms—one 300-month 
sentence and one 240-month sentence—to be served concurrently 
and thereafter appealed.240 
Mr. Jimenez-Antunez’s appeal presented a question of first 
impression for the Eleventh Circuit: “whether a criminal 
defendant must show good cause to dismiss retained counsel if the 
defendant intends to seek appointed counsel.”241 The court 
specified that it was reviewing the district court’s denial of the 
motion to withdraw as counsel for abuse of discretion.242 
                                                                                                     
 237. See id. at 1269–70 (“[Mr. Jimenez-Antunez] wrote, ‘I do not want your 
services anymore, and I do not want you to represent me anymore; so the Judge 
can appoint another counsel for me, and so the Judge may know my reasons and 
my motives why I am asking for this change.’”). 
 238. See id. at 1270 (detailing Mr. Joshi’s motion to withdraw as defense 
counsel). In response to Mr. Joshi’s motion to withdraw, the district court 
rescheduled the sentencing hearing for December 14, 2014. Id. At the beginning 
of the hearing, the district court reviewed Mr. Joshi’s motion to withdraw and 
heard statements from Mr. Jimenez-Antunez about the disagreement over how 
to handle the case, feelings of coercion, and lack of communication between 
himself and the lawyer. Id. The district court responded to each of Mr. 
Jimenez-Antunez’s complaints in turn: (1) it suspected that Mr. Jimenez-Antunez 
was disappointed with the guideline range, not the way the case was handled; 
(2) there was no evidence that Mr. Joshi had coerced Mr. Jimenez-Antunez into 
pleading guilty; and (3) Mr. Joshi must have had more recent contact with his 
client than Mr. Jimenez-Antunez was giving him credit considering they had 
reviewed the presentence investigation report together just three months before. 
Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See id. (stating the sentencing outcome that led to the appeal to the 
Eleventh Circuit). 
 241. Id. at 1269. 
 242. See id. at 1270 (stating the standard of review (quoting Brown v. United 
States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2013))). The court further stipulated that 
“‘[a] district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, 
applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper 
procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly 
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The court began its analysis by distinguishing between the 
standards that apply to indigent criminal defendants’ requests to 
substitute appointed counsel—requiring a showing of good cause—
and those that apply to criminal defendants who do not require 
appointed counsel—a near-absolute right.243 Mr. 
Jimenez-Antunez’s appeal required the court to determine which 
of these two standards applied to a defendant who moves to replace 
retained counsel with appointed counsel.244 The court addressed 
the issue by considering the timeline of requests; Mr. 
Jimenez-Antunez first requested to discharge his retained 
counsel.245 The court stated that Mr. Jimenez-Antunez’s “right to 
choose counsel is incomplete if it does not include the right to 
discharge counsel that [he] no longer chooses.”246 This is true even 
if the indigent defendant’s decision to discharge retained counsel 
requires the court to appoint counsel to take his place.247 
                                                                                                     
erroneous.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Toll, 804 F.3d 1344, 1353 (11th Cir. 
2015)). 
 243. See id. at 1270–71 (distinguishing standards that apply to different 
subsets of criminal defendants). In doing so, the court recognized the importance 
of the Sixth Amendment guarantee to counsel of choice. Id. (citing United States 
v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006)). For criminal defendants who do 
not require appointed counsel, they may substitute different retained counsel 
“‘regardless of the quality of the representation he received,’” qualified only by not 
interfering with the “‘fair, orderly and effective administration of the courts.’” Id. 
at 1271 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006); 
United States v. Koblitz, 803 F.2d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir. 1986)). Alternatively, 
“[a]n indigent criminal defendant who seeks appointed counsel ‘does not have a 
right to have a particular lawyer represent him nor to demand a different 
appointed lawyer except for good cause.’” Id. (quoting Thomas v. Wainwright, 767 
F.2d 738, 742 (11th Cir. 1985)). Good cause exists where the attorney and client 
experience “a fundamental problem, ‘such as a conflict of interest, a complete 
breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an 
apparently unjust verdict.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 
1263 (11th Cir. 2008)). 
 244. See id. (stating the root of the issue presented to the court). 
 245. See id. (“This appeal requires that we decide which standard applies 
when a defendant moves to replace retained counsel with appointed counsel. And 
the order of that sequence supplies the answer.”). 
 246. Id. 
 247. See id. (“[W]hen an indigent defendant has exercised the right to 
dispense with a retained lawyer, the right to effective representation . . . might 
require that appointed counsel take his place.”). The court elaborated, “[b]ecause 
a defendant who moves to dismiss his retained counsel maintains the right to 
counsel of choice, a district court cannot require the defendant to show good 
cause.” Id. 
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The court proceeded to expressly affirm the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Brown.248 Additionally, the court cited 
several other lower court decisions that have held that an indigent 
criminal defendant “who seeks to discharge retained counsel and 
have the court appoint counsel may do so unless the substitution 
would delay court proceedings, prejudice the parties, or disrupt 
‘the orderly process of justice.’”249 Rejecting the view of the First 
Circuit, the court stated that the First Circuit incorrectly conflated 
the right to counsel of choice and the right to effective counsel when 
in actuality the rights are distinct.250 
The court explained the correct procedure for addressing a 
motion to withdraw: 
[B]efore granting a motion to dismiss retained counsel, a 
district court must determine that the criminal defendant 
either will be represented by counsel or had made a knowing 
and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. If a defendant 
intends to move the court to appoint counsel, the court should 
determine whether the defendant is eligible for appointed 
counsel. Even when a district court is assured that a defendant 
                                                                                                     
 248. United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 2015). The court cited 
favorably the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that such a request, to dismiss retained 
counsel and substitute appointed counsel, implicates the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel of choice and therefore, courts cannot require a defendant to meet an 
additional threshold showing of good cause. Id.  
 249. United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1271–72 (11th Cir. 
2016) (quoting Dixon v. Owens, 865 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); 
accord People v. Ortiz, 800 P.2d 547, 555 (Cal. 1990)). The court in 
Jimenez-Antunez further cited several state intermediate courts that have 
adopted similar approaches to an indigent criminal defendant’s motion of this 
sort. See People v. Abernathy, 926 N.E.2d 435, 440–44 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) 
(discussing the denial of Mr. Abernathy’s motion to discharge retained counsel 
and seek court-appointed counsel and concluding that the trial court erred by 
denying the defendant’s right to counsel of choice); People v. Munsey, 232 P.3d 
113, 126–27 (Colo. App. 2009) (detailing the denial of Ms. Munsey’s motion to 
discharge retained counsel, distinguishing her situation from that of an indigent 
defendant dissatisfied with appointed counsel, and concluding that the trial court 
erred in denying her right to counsel of choice); State v. Barber, 206 P.3d 1223, 
1234–36 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) (identifying the unique situation presented by a 
request to discharge retained counsel and seek appointed counsel and 
determining that Mr. Barber was not required to offer any explanation for his 
motion to dismiss privately retained counsel and seek appointed counsel). 
 250. See id. at 1272 (“[The First Circuit’s] decision conflates the two rights at 
issue, contrary to the later explanation by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Gonzalez-Lopez that the rights are distinct.” (citing United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 540 U.S. 140, 148 (2006))). 
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will have representation or has waived the assistance of 
counsel, a court may still deny a motion to substitute retained 
counsel if it will interfere with the “fair, orderly, and effective 
administration of the courts.”251 
Here, the appellate court found that the district court incorrectly 
considered Mr. Joshi’s performance, an inquiry relevant only to 
Mr. Jimenez-Antunez’s right to effective assistance of counsel, not 
his right to counsel of choice.252 Further, the district court provided 
no reason why granting the motion would have interfered with the 
effective administration of the courts.253 The court concluded that 
the district court’s denial of the motion after application of the 
incorrect standard was reversible error, vacated Mr. 
Jimenez-Antunez’s convictions, and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.254 The Eleventh Circuit’s express support of the Ninth 
Circuit’s procedure—and condemnation of the First Circuit’s 
procedure—demonstrates a clear disagreement regarding how the 
constitutional right to counsel of choice should be treated and how 
such motions ought to be handled. 
IV. Argument for Adopting a Two-Part Motions Analysis: 
Highlighting the Importance of the Sixth Amendment Guarantees 
These conflicting standards for addressing motions to 
substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel create confusion 
and uncertainty for indigent criminal defendants, who are among 
the most vulnerable individuals in society.255 Aside from the 
importance of providing a clear protocol for the benefit of these 
                                                                                                     
 251. Id. (quoting United States v. Koblitz, 803 F.2d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir. 
1986)) (internal citations omitted). 
 252. See id. (stating the error of the district court in considering Mr. Joshi’s 
performance in the motion to withdraw). 
 253. See id. (“The district court offered no reasons why granting the motion 
would have interfered with the fair, orderly, and effective administration of the 
courts . . . .”). The court further explained that it could infer no such reason from 
the record. Id. at 1273. 
 254. See id. at 1273 (detailing the court’s conclusion). 
 255. See Michael S. Greco, Court Access Should Not Be Rationed, A.B.A.J., 
Dec. 2005, at 1, 6 (discussing indigent criminal defendants and stating that “[t]he 
importance of ensuring access to legal services and to justice for the most 
vulnerable in society cannot be overstated”). 
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indigent defendants, uniformity is critical for the integrity of the 
judicial system.256  
After Mota-Santana, the First Circuit would require the 
hypothetical “William Defendant” to provide the district court with 
a good cause rationale to substitute appointed counsel for retained 
counsel.257 Further, the First Circuit incorrectly insists this case 
presents a question concerning the effectiveness of Mr. 
Mota-Santana’s lawyer, when in actuality it implicates a question 
concerning Mr. Mota-Santana’s right to counsel of choice.258 Mr. 
Sanchez’s motion to withdraw as counsel for Mr. Mota-Santana 
requires an analysis of the latter’s right to counsel of choice, a 
phrase not mentioned and a concept barely addressed in the 
opinion.259 Instead, the court continued with the district court’s 
analysis into conflict of interest and stated that United States v. 
Allen controlled.260 Yet, Allen is readily distinguishable from Mr. 
Mota-Santana’s case.261 
                                                                                                     
 256. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedents and Prediction: The Forward-Looking 
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 40 (1994) (“[U]niform 
interpretation of federal law helps to secure popular respect for judicial authority. 
Federal courts depend on the perceived legitimacy of their enterprise for their 
authority over other government actors and the general public.”). 
 257. See United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(requiring good cause for substitution of counsel). 
 258. See id. at 45 (stating the appellate issue and proceeding to analyze the 
district court’s inquiry into the alleged conflict between Mr. Mota-Santana and 
his lawyer).  
 259. See id. at 46 
In the instant case, there are two actions of the court at issue: its 
refusal to allow Sanchez to withdraw and its refusal to appoint 
substitute counsel. Were the only issue that of the appropriateness of 
the court’s refusal to permit withdrawal, Sanchez having been retained 
privately, there might be some question. As we said in United States v. 
Woodard . . . a defendant is not ordinarily dependent on the court’s 
permission to replace retained counsel. But here the two actions 
merge . . . . 
(citing United States v. Woodard, 291 F.3d 95, 107 (1st. Cir. 2002)). 
 260. See Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 47 (“We find ourselves in the same 
situation as in Allen: ‘Good cause for substitution of counsel cannot be determined 
solely according to the subjective standard of what the defendant perceives.’” 
(quoting United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 1986))). 
 261. See United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 91 (1st Cir. 1986) (discussing Mr. 
Allen’s appeal from the district court’s denial of his motion to substitute different 
appointed counsel for current appointed counsel). Norman Allen appealed from a 
conviction on charges involving the possession of marijuana. Id. Mr. Allen had 
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The First Circuit’s ill-founded reliance on Allen caused the 
court to conflate the standards to be applied to indigent criminal 
defendants seeking to substitute appointed counsel for current 
appointed counsel with that of indigent criminal defendants 
seeking substitute appointed counsel for retained counsel.262 The 
Eleventh Circuit addressed the necessary distinction twelve years 
later in United States v. Jimenez-Antunez.263 The necessity of this 
distinction is more apparent if the requests presented in defense 
counsel’s motion to withdraw are treated separately, instead of 
understood as a singular request.264 Had the First Circuit chosen 
to treat these requests separately, the first question would have 
been whether Mr. Mota-Santana was permitted to discharge 
retained counsel.265 The right to discharge retained counsel is an 
                                                                                                     
been initially appointed Mr. Owen Walker, a federal defender, to serve as his 
counsel. Id. Five months following Mr. Walker’s appointment, Mr. Allen wrote a 
letter to the court describing his dissatisfaction with his lawyer and belief that if 
he had a proper defense he would prove his innocence. Id. Mr. Allen never filed a 
motion for leave to withdraw or substitute counsel. Id. at 91–92. The court 
understood Mr. Allen’s subsequent comments at the pre-trial colloquy to be a 
request for a continuance and denied the motion. Id. On appeal, Mr. Allen argued 
that his Sixth Amendment right was violated by the district court’s failure to 
adequately inquire into his request for substitute counsel. Id. The First Circuit 
stated that “[a]s an indigent defendant, appellant did have the right to be 
represented by counsel, but he did not have a right to have a particular lawyer 
represent him, nor to demand a different appointed lawyer except for good cause.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 262. See Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 47 (1st Cir. 2004) (analogizing the case 
to the issue presented in Allen). 
 263. See United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1270–71 (11th 
Cir. 2016) (distinguishing between the standards that apply to an indigent 
criminal defendant who seeks alternative appointed counsel and an indigent 
criminal defendant who seeks substitute appointed counsel for retained counsel). 
 264. Compare Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 47–48 (“In the instant case, there 
are two actions of the course at issue . . . [b]ut here the two actions merge . . . .”), 
with United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1343 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[A] defendant 
who has hired his own attorney ‘has a different right, independent and distinct 
from the right to effective counsel, to be represented by the attorney of his choice.’” 
(quoting United States v. Mendez-Sanchez, 563 F.3d 935, 979 (9th Cir. 2009))), 
and Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1271 (‘This appeal requires that we decide 
which standard applies when a defendant moves to replace retained counsel with 
appointed counsel. And the order of that sequence supplies the answer.”). 
 265. See United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(stating the first action to be the district court’s refusal to allow Mr. Sanchez to 
withdraw). 
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issue controlled by the Sixth Amendment.266 Because United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez267 had not yet been decided, Wheat v. 
United States268 was controlling Supreme Court law regarding a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.269 
Following Wheat should have led to the conclusion that such an 
indigent criminal defendant is permitted to dismiss retained 
counsel. Therefore, the only question left would be whether the 
defendant seeks court-appointed counsel or intends to waive the 
right to counsel and proceed pro se.270 If the defendant thereafter 
seeks the appointment of counsel, the court has a duty to 
determine the defendant’s eligibility and appoint counsel if so 
required.271 
                                                                                                     
 266. See Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys’ Fees under RICO and CEE 
and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid 
It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 765, 786 (1989) (“Like many fundamental constitutional 
rights, the right to counsel of choice is not absolute and may depend on the 
financial resources of the individual who seeks to exercise it. The right, however, 
is unquestionably an ‘essential component’ or ‘essential element’ of the sixth 
amendment [sic].”). 
 267. 548 U.S. 140 (2006). 
 268. 486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
 269. See id. at 159 (accepting the premise that the right to counsel of choice 
is an aspect of the Sixth Amendment). The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits relied 
heavily on Gonzalez-Lopez, likely due to the clarity of the opinion concerning the 
right to counsel of choice for different subclasses of criminal defendants, but the 
fundamental nature of the right to counsel of choice was recognized in Wheat and 
controlled at the time of the Mota-Santana decision. See Brown, 785 F.3d at 1343–
44 (recognizing the constitutional origins of a defendant’s right to counsel of 
choice (citing Gonzalez Lopez, 548 U.S. 147–48); see also Jimenez-Antunez, 820 
F.3d at 1270 (explaining the centrality of the right to counsel of choice in the Sixth 
Amendment (citing Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147–48)). The scope of this Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel of choice is circumscribed by the requirement that 
granting such a motion not “interfere[] with the fair, orderly, and effective 
administration of the courts.” Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1272. 
 270. See United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1272 (11th Cir. 
2016) 
[A] district court must determine that the criminal defendant either 
will be represented by counsel or has made a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of the right to counsel. If a defendant intends to move the court 
to appoint counsel, the court should determine whether the defendant 
is eligible for appointed counsel. 
(citations omitted). 
 271. See Brown, 785 F.3d at 1345 
[I]n federal court the question whether counsel should be appointed is 
governed . . . by the [Criminal Justice Act]. Of course, as a practical 
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Had the First Circuit treated the actions in Mr. Sanchez’s 
motion to withdraw as defense counsel for Mr. Mota-Santana 
separately, the court may have been forced to address criminal 
defendants’ constitutional right to counsel of choice and may 
thereafter have come to a different conclusion. It is also possible 
that had the First Circuit first addressed this issue 
post-Gonzalez-Lopez that it would have been compelled to confront 
the Supreme Court’s express declaration that the “root” meaning 
of the Sixth Amendment is the criminal defendant’s right to their 
counsel of choice.272 As such, the First Circuit may have come to 
the same result regarding this issue as the Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits, both decided post-Gonzalez-Lopez. Nonetheless, the First 
Circuit’s decision to treat the defendant’s motion as a single action 
has some degree of merit. 
It is critical to note that the trial court’s decision concerning 
the indigent criminal defendant’s motion to dismiss retained 
counsel will often effectively bind the court’s decision in the 
subsequent action.273 The fact that the former action may be 
determinative of the subsequent decision to appoint counsel does 
not make the consideration of the issues separately any less 
necessary. Doing so is the only way in which an indigent criminal 
defendant will be able to enjoy the benefit of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel of choice.274 Therefore, in order to properly provide 
constitutional protections to indigent criminal defendants, such as 
Mr. Mota-Santana, it is critical to first address the desire to 
                                                                                                     
matter the two issues—discharge of retained counsel and appointment 
of CJA counsel—are intertwined, and the decisions as to them will 
ordinarily be considered and announced together. However, the 
sequence and manner in which the two issues are addressed may not 
leave the defendant without any counsel at all, absent a voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent decision to proceed pro se. 
(citations omitted). 
 272. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146–47 (discussing that the defendant’s 
right to counsel of choice is the core of the Sixth Amendment). 
 273. See United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1345 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating 
that although the two issues are separate, they are frequently intertwined, and a 
decision concerning the defendant’s right to dismiss retained counsel will often 
determine how the court must subsequently proceed). 
 274. See Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1272 (“[W]e are not persuaded that the 
only relevant action is the second request to engage new counsel or that the 
motion to dismiss retained counsel no longer implicates the right to counsel of 
choice.”). 
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discharge counsel followed by addressing any wish to have counsel 
appointed or to proceed pro se—the procedure adopted by both the 
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.275 
Several policy rationales likely framed the First Circuit’s 
decision, such as: excess economic costs,276 discouraging 
gamesmanship by defendants and defense counsel,277 and 
promoting effective administration of the judicial system.278 These 
policy rationales are analogous to those that framed the Supreme 
Court’s decision to restrict counsel of choice for indigent criminal 
defendants with appointed counsel.279 Specifically, with regard to 
indigent criminal defendants seeking substitute court-appointed 
counsel, these justifications “dictate that judges should consider 
less severe remedies before exercising the removal option.”280 
These policy issues sufficiently justify the narrowly tailored right 
to counsel of choice for indigent criminal defendants. Yet, it is 
important to acknowledge and understand the distinction drawn 
between the cases of Mr. Mota-Santana, Mr. Brown, and Mr. 
Jimenez-Antunez and the cases of Mr. Cronic and Mr. Allen.281 The 
                                                                                                     
 275. See Brown, 785 F.3d at 1346 (“Once a district court allows a financially 
qualified defendant to exercise his right to fire his retained lawyer, § 3006A(b) 
requires, absent a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision to proceed pro se, 
that the court appoint a new attorney in his place.” (emphasis in original) 
(citations omitted)); see also Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1272 (describing the 
proper procedure for handling an indigent criminal defendant’s desire to 
discharge retained counsel). 
 276. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s Right 
to Counsel, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1258 (2006) (discussing the interest in 
judicial economy deterring judges from appointing substitute court-appointed 
counsel for an indigent criminal defendant). 
 277. See Jay Williams Burnett & Catherine Green Burnett, Ethical Dilemmas 
Confronting a Felony Trial Judge: To Remove or Not to Remove Deficient Counsel, 
41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1315, 1336 (2000) (discussing the importance of preserving 
democratic ideals and judicial integrity and the strain placed by the request to 
disqualify or replace counsel). 
 278. See id. (“A second cost factor is administrative and involves both the 
delay in beginning a new trial and the judicial resources that were expended 
throughout the course of the aborted trial.”). 
 279. See Keith Swisher, Disqualifying Defense Counsel: The Curse of the Sixth 
Amendment, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 374, 389–90 (2014) (discussing 
the policy rationales behind denying indigent defendants’ right to counsel of 
choice with regard to court-appointed counsel). 
 280. Id.  
 281. Compare United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 43–45 (1st Cir. 
2004) (examining the case of an indigent criminal defendant’s request to 
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former group of defendants retained counsel and enjoy the 
complete Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.282 Although 
the right to counsel of choice is qualified for all criminal 
defendants,283 generally defendants with retained counsel can fire 
counsel “for any reason or for no reason.”284  
Despite numerous policy rationales pointing to the contrary, 
to ensure that indigent defendants receive the benefit of the “root 
meaning” of the Sixth Amendment,285 William Defendant and 
other similarly situated indigent criminal defendants must be 
permitted to discharge retained counsel and seek appointed 
counsel without satisfying a good cause showing through proof of 
a severe conflict of interest, breakdown in communication, or 
another problem in the attorney-client relationship. This approach 
is critical considering “until just last Term, no criminal defendant 
had ever persuaded the Court to reverse a conviction solely on 
counsel-of-choice grounds; many had tried in vain.”286  
                                                                                                     
discharge retained counsel and seek court-appointed counsel (emphasis added)), 
and United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1340–43 (9th Cir. 2015) (considering 
an indigent criminal defendant’s appeal from the denial of his motion to discharge 
retained counsel and seek court-appointed counsel (emphasis added)), and United 
States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1269–70 (11th Cir. 2016) (considering 
the issue of whether an indigent criminal defendant needs to show good cause in 
order to discharge retained counsel and seek court-appointed counsel (emphasis 
added)), with United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (1984) (concluding 
that the proper inquiry concerning an indigent criminal defendant’s request to 
replace appointed counsel with subsequent appointed counsel is whether the 
attorney is a “reasonably effective advocate” (emphasis added)), and United 
States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 91–92 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing the standard 
required to be shown for an indigent criminal defendant to replace appointed 
counsel with subsequent appointed counsel (emphasis added)). 
 282. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006) (“Where 
the right to be assisted by counsel of one’s choice is wrongly denied . . . it is 
unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth 
Amendment violation.”). 
 283. See Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1270 (discussing the criminal 
defendant’s right to counsel of choice as being tailored by ensuring the “effective 
administration of the courts”). 
 284. United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 285. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147–48 (“The right to select counsel of 
one’s choice . . . has never been derived from the Sixth Amendment’s purpose of 
ensuring a fair trial. It has been regarded as the root meaning of the 
constitutional guarantee.”). 
 286. John Rappaport, The Structural Function of the Sixth Amendment Right 
to Counsel of Choice 1–3, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (Univ. of Chi., 
Pub. Law Working Paper no. 611). 
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In United States v. Luis287 last term, the Supreme Court for 
the first time vacated and remanded a case after finding that the 
government’s action undermined the defendant’s fundamental 
right to the assistance of counsel of the defendant’s choice.288 
Professor John Rappaport contends that the reason the Supreme 
Court consistently denies relief for criminal defendants deprived 
of the right to counsel of choice is that “the doctrine treats counsel 
of choice not as individual right at all,” but is instead masked with 
alternative motives.289 Whatever the theory may be to explain the 
Court’s unwillingness to grant relief to defendants based solely on 
the denial of their right to counsel of choice, one thing is certain: it 
is incredibly difficult to have a conviction reversed solely on the 
basis of a denial of the “root meaning” of the Sixth Amendment.290 
Professor Rappaport brings to light the significant 
“disjuncture between what the Court says about the right to 
counsel of choice and what it does when presented an asserted 
violation of that right.”291 Due to the difficulty and extreme 
unlikelihood of reversing a conviction based on the denial of a 
defendant’s right to counsel of choice,292 it is important that lower 
courts apply a standard to indigent criminal defendants seeking to 
substitute appointed counsel for retained counsel that allows 
enjoyment of their full Sixth Amendment right. For example, the 
government in United States v. Brown argued that several 
prerequisites qualified Mr. Brown’s request to substitute 
                                                                                                     
 287. 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016). 
 288. See id. at 1096 (stating the conclusion of the Court). 
 289. See Rappaport, supra note 286, at 46 (“My claim is that the Court’s 
decisions are explicable upon the realization that the doctrine treats counsel of 
choice not as an individual right at all, but instead as a system-level safeguard 
against a socialized criminal defense bar.”). 
 290. See id. at 1 (stating the Court’s finding that counsel of choice is the “root 
meaning” of the Sixth Amendment and yet the Court has only specifically 
remedied such a violation once). 
 291. Id.  
 292. See id. at 46 
Scholarly analysis of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice 
is largely critical. Motivating the criticism is a sense that the Court has 
been getting the cases wrong. Until [United States v.] Luis, the Court 
consistently rejected defendants’ counsel-of choice claims, even when 
the balance of individual and government interests did not clearly 
favor the state. 
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appointed counsel for retained counsel.293 The court responded 
that “the government’s statutory interpretation would, in effect, 
provide Brown with less access to counsel than that to which he is 
constitutionally entitled, by potentially denying him any counsel if 
he exercises his constitutional right to discharge retained 
counsel.”294  
To adopt the statutory interpretation advocated by the 
government in Brown295 would undoubtedly deny criminal 
defendants like Mr. Mota-Santana the right to counsel of choice.296 
Because the Supreme Court has expressly recognized the 
centrality of the right to counsel of choice in Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence, it is critical to apply this right to all those eligible 
for its protection, specifically indigent criminal defendants seeking 
to substitute court-appointed counsel for retained counsel.297 
                                                                                                     
 293. See United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1345 (9th Cir. 2015) 
The government maintains that, in cases like this one, . . . the factors 
relevant to the appointment of counsel issue are “the timeliness of the 
motion; the adequacy of the district court’s inquiry into the defendant’s 
complaint; and the asserted cause for that complaint, including the 
extent of the conflict or breakdown in communication between lawyer 
and client (and the client’s own responsibility, if any, for that conflict).” 
(quoting Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276, 1287 (2012)). 
 294. Id. at 1346. 
 295. See id. (stating the government’s position that several factors must be 
considered prior to granting a defendant’s motion for retained counsel to 
withdraw and for the court to appoint counsel). 
 296. See United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2004) (“In 
short, we think the district court gave adequate attention to the issues raised by 
defendant, and made appropriate inquiry into the causes and merits of the 
complaints. We hold that it was well within its discretion in refusing to appoint 
new counsel.”) The First Circuit came to this conclusion after considering the 
existence of a conflict of interest between Mr. Mota-Santana and his counsel, an 
inquiry inappropriate in cases presenting counsel of choice issues. See id. at 46 
(“We . . . refuse appellant’s suggestion to treat this as a case presenting notice of 
a potential conflict of interest requiring a special inquiry and the draconian 
remedy of reversal without a showing of prejudice.”); Brown, 785 F.3d at 1347 
(“The appropriate standard must reflect the Sixth Amendment right which 
governs a particular case. Where, as here, the right to retained counsel of choice 
is implicated, Rivera-Corona specifically held that the ‘extent-of-conflict review is 
inappropriate.’” (quoting United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 981 (9th 
Cir. 2010))). 
 297. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006) 
Deprivation of the right [to counsel of choice] is “complete” when the 
defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by the 
lawyer he wants, regardless of the quality of the representation he 
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Further, due to the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to remedy 
violations of criminal defendants’ right to counsel of choice, it is 
essential to avoid such violations by ensuring that all criminal 
defendants, including those indigent defendants discussed here, 
are able to exercise their constitutional right without obstacles. To 
provide otherwise would deny these indigent criminal defendants 
any counsel if they choose to exercise their right to counsel of choice 
by discharging their retained counsel. Such action affords less 
access to counsel to these defendants than they are 
constitutionally entitled.298  
To require that indigent criminal defendants seeking to 
substitute appointed counsel for retained counsel show good cause 
constitutes a denial of the right to counsel of choice, a structural 
error warranting reversal without a showing of prejudice.299 As 
previously discussed, and highlighted by Professor Rappaport, the 
Supreme Court is extraordinarily unlikely to rule in favor of a 
criminal defendant appealing solely on the basis of the denial of 
their right to counsel of choice, as the Court has only reversed such 
a conviction once.300 In order to ensure that indigent criminal 
defendants do not find themselves up against all odds submitting 
a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court after continued denials of 
their Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice, it is necessary 
to address the issue from the bottom-up.  
Trial courts must not require indigent criminal defendants 
seeking to substitute appointed counsel for retained counsel to 
show good cause and engage in a conflict analysis.301 Instead, trial 
courts should recognize the right to counsel of choice in these 
                                                                                                     
received. To argue otherwise is to confuse the right to counsel of 
choice . . . with the right to effective counsel . . . . 
 298. See Brown, 785 F.3d at 1346 (describing the constitutional implications 
of requiring a showing of good cause prior to granting a defendant’s motion to 
discharge retained counsel and seek court-appointed counsel). 
 299. See id. at 1350 (“The denial of a defendant’s right to counsel of choice is 
a structural error, requiring that convictions be vacated even without a showing 
of prejudice.” (citing Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150)). 
 300. See Rappaport, supra note 286, at 1–3 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
poor history of upholding and preserving criminal defendants’ right to counsel of 
choice). 
 301. See United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1346 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(concluding that a conflict of interest analysis is inappropriate where an indigent 
criminal defendant seeks to discharge retained counsel). 
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situations by separating the actions within a defense counsel’s 
motion to withdraw into an issue concerning counsel of choice and 
an issue concerning the right to court-appointed counsel.302 Doing 
so will safeguard these defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights.303 
Subsequent appellate courts must also recognize the division of 
actions and identify denials of defendants’ right to counsel of 
choice. Upon recognition of the denial, appellate courts must treat 
such denials as structural errors and grant reversals without 
requiring the defendant to show prejudice.304  
V. Conclusion 
The American criminal justice system has grown and evolved, 
and our constitutional rights and protections have grown and 
evolved along with it. The Sixth Amendment rights, stemming 
exclusively from the Counsel Clause, that American citizens enjoy 
today grew out of a system where criminals accused of the most 
heinous crimes were strictly forbidden from the assistance of 
counsel out of fear of what it might do to the unstable 
government.305 The Sixth Amendment’s Counsel Clause now 
encompasses five separate rights for criminal defendants,306 an 
                                                                                                     
 302. See United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267, 1272 (11th Cir. 
2016) (describing the court’s rejection of the First Circuit’s treatment of such 
motions as containing one merged action). While these actions are to be treated 
separately it is important to understand the issues are intertwined in the sense 
that upon a court’s allowance of the defendant’s motion to discharge retained 
counsel, it must thereafter appoint counsel or receive a waiver of the right to 
counsel. See id. (“To be sure, a district court reviewing a motion to dismiss counsel 
must know how the defendant wishes to proceed so that the defendant will not be 
left without representation in violation of the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 303. See Brown, 785 F.3d at 1344 (“[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
of choice means that a defendant has a right to ‘fire his retained . . . lawyer . . . for 
any reason or [for] no reason.’” (quoting United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 
976, 980 (9th Cir. 2010))). 
 304. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150 (“We have little trouble concluding 
that erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, ‘with consequences 
that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies 
as “structural error.’” (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282 (1993))). 
 305. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 5 (“The common law rule prohibiting 
those charged with serious offenses from employing counsel was thought to be a 
necessary measure to ensure the monarch’s preservation.”). 
 306. These rights include: (1) the right to counsel of choice; (2); the right to 
court-appointed counsel; (3) the right to conflict-free counsel; (4) the right to the 
IN THEIR DEFENSE 1795 
idea that may have never crossed the minds of the Ratifiers in 
1791.307 The development of these rights inevitably led to conflict, 
notably among the First Circuit and the Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits, concerning the rights to counsel of choice and 
court-appointed counsel.308 This conflict between circuits creates 
confusion and provides for unequal enjoyment of the same 
constitutional right. Such unequal enjoyment of what is 
understood to be the “root meaning” of a constitutional amendment 
may also be cause for concern regarding the integrity of the judicial 
system.309 
                                                                                                     
effective assistance of counsel; and (5) the right to represent oneself pro se. See 
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006) (“The right to select 
counsel of one’s choice . . . has been regarded as the root meaning of the 
constitutional guarantee [of the Sixth Amendment].”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person 
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial 
unless counsel is provided for him.”); Bonin v. California, 494 U.S. 1039, 1044 
(1990) (“[A] defendant that shows an actual conflict need not demonstrate that 
his counsel’s divided loyalties prejudiced the outcome of his trial.” (citing Cuyler 
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349–50 (1980))); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 689 (1984) (“[T]he purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth 
Amendment is . . . to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.”); 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (“The Sixth Amendment . . . grants 
to the accused personally the right to make his defense. Although not stated in 
the Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representation—to make one’s 
own defense personally—is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the 
Amendment.”); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) (“The 
mere physical presence of an attorney does not fulfill the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee when the advocate’s conflicting obligations have effectively sealed his 
lips on crucial matters.”). 
 307. See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 20 (“In 1791, that provision became the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”). 
 308. Compare United States v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(requiring an indigent criminal defendant to show good cause in order to 
discharge retained counsel and seek appointed counsel), with United States v. 
Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1346 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that a criminal defendant 
need not show good cause in order to discharge retained counsel based on the 
Sixth Amendment), and Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1271 (citing favorably the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision not to require indigent criminal defendants to satisfy a 
showing prior to dismissing retained counsel). 
 309. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147–48 (concluding that the right to 
counsel of choice is the “root meaning” of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause). 
One legal scholar argues that circuit splits in interpreting the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines are particularly undesirable due to the need for uniformity. See Seth 
Yohalem, We’ll Always Have Parish: The Ninth Circuit Decision and Its 
Implications for Enforcement of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 37 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 525, 545 (2004). The need for uniformity is even more 
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At present, if William Defendant finds himself in the First 
Circuit, he will be required to show a significant conflict of interest 
or other extraordinary circumstance in order to dismiss his 
retained counsel and receive court-appointed counsel.310 
Conversely, if William Defendant finds himself in the Ninth or 
Eleventh Circuits, he will be permitted to dismiss his retained 
counsel and then decide whether to seek court-appointed counsel 
or proceed pro se.311 Between these two standards, the Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits more fully realize and apply the constitutional 
command set forth in Gonzalez-Lopez.312 William Defendant’s 
motion to substitute appointed counsel for retained counsel should 
be treated as including two separate actions: (1) the desire to 
discharge retained counsel and (2) the desire to subsequently be 
represented by court-appointed counsel.313 By treating these as 
separate actions, and not merging them as did the First Circuit, 
courts will necessarily have to apply the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel of choice to the first action and 
thereafter determine whether they are eligible for appointed 
counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b).314 
                                                                                                     
important when discussing enjoyment of a constitutional right to the same class 
of citizens in different circuits. 
 310. See Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d at 48 (“[A] defendant ‘must show that the 
conflict between lawyer and client was so profound as to cause a total breakdown 
in communication,’ preventing an adequate defense.” (quoting United States v. 
Myers, 294 F.3d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 2002))). 
 311. See Brown, 785 F.3d at 1348 (“[G]iven Brown’s right to discharge his 
retained attorney if he chose to do so, it did not matter whether the court 
considered Brown’s current lawyer well qualified, or prepared for trial, 
or . . . better than the alternative.”); see also United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 
820 F.3d 1267, 1270 (11th Cir. 2016) (“A defendant exercises the right to counsel 
of choice when he moves to dismiss retained counsel, regardless of the type of 
counsel he wishes to engage afterward.”). 
 312. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148–48 (finding the right to counsel of 
choice to be at the core of the Sixth Amendment and stating that deprivation 
occurs when a defendant is prevented from being represented by the lawyer he or 
she wants, regardless of the quality of representation received). 
 313. See Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d at 1272 (finding that a defendant’s 
motion to dismiss retained counsel and seek court appointed counsel does not 
include merged actions, but rather two distinct actions). 
 314. See Brown, 785 F.3d at 1346 (stating that the proper procedure for such 
a motion is to apply the constitutional rule in the defendant’s favor followed by 
application of “the appropriate statutory rule for the appointed of counsel to an 
indigent defendant”). 
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To be clear, this proposed framework does not provide indigent 
criminal defendants an excuse, on the eve of trial, to seek 
substitution of appointed counsel for retained counsel.315 A 
criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice 
can, and ought to be limited by “compelling purposes” such as 
ensuring the “fair, efficient, and orderly administration of 
justice.”316 Aside from this general qualification of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel of choice for criminal defendants with 
retained counsel, indigent defendants such as William Defendant 
should not be required to satisfy any further judicially qualified 
showing. To impose the burden of showing good cause on such 
defendants will inevitably lead to erroneous denials of their Sixth 
Amendment rights rarely corrected on appeal.317 
                                                                                                     
 315. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006) (“We have 
recognized the trial court’s wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice 
against the needs of fairness, and against the demands of its calendar.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 316. United States v. Ensign, 491 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 317. See Rappaport, supra note 286, at 1–3 (stating the extraordinarily 
infrequent relief granted to criminal defendants appealing from a stated denial of 
their Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice). 
